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RECONSTRUCTING STATE REPUBLICS 
Francesca L. Procaccini* 
 
Our national political dysfunction is rooted in constitutionally 
dysfunctional states.  States today are devolving into modern aristocracies 
through laws that depress popular control, entwine wealth and power, and 
insulate incumbents from democratic oversight and accountability.  These 
unrepublican states corrupt the entire United States.  It is for this reason that 
the Constitution obligates the United States to restore ailing states to their 
full republican strength.  But how?  For all its attention to process, the 
Constitution is silent on how the United States may exercise its sweeping 
Article IV power to “guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government.”  As states descend into aristocratic cabals, the 
question of how to enforce the guarantee is of existential importance.  This 
Article illuminates three enforcement mechanisms:  direct legislation, 
federal incentives, and reconstructing state governments.  It establishes that 
Congress, not the U.S. Supreme Court, is the institutional actor most capable 
of addressing the republican rot now plaguing the states. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Something is rotten in the American states.  Currently, fifty-nine million 
Americans live under minority legislative rule in their states.1  Nearly half 
suffer extreme misrepresentation under state legislatures whose political 
makeup differs from the state’s popular vote by fifteen percentage points or 
more.2  In some states, the legislature is stacked with 25 to 30 percent more 
party members than that party won at the polls.3 
A separate group of over five million adult citizens is explicitly deprived 
of the right to vote by state law.4  This is more people than the total state 
population in twenty-nine states.5  In six states—with a combined population 
of over forty-nine million Americans—these disenfranchisement laws 
prohibit between 6 and 11 percent of the adult citizenry from voting.6  Seven 
states disenfranchise over 15 percent of their Black populations—two 
disenfranchise over 20 percent.7 
At the same time, it costs over three times the median household income 
to win a state legislative seat.8  Nearly impenetrable class stratification 
 
 1. CHRISTIAN R. GROSE ET AL., THE WORST PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS IN U.S. STATE 
LEGISLATURES 6 (2019). 
 2. Id. at 7–9. 
 3. Id. at 12–13. 
 4. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENT’G PROJECT, LOCKED OUT 2020:  ESTIMATES OF 
PEOPLE DENIED VOTING RIGHTS DUE TO A FELONY CONVICTION 4 (2020), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/locked-out-2020-estimates-of-people-
denied-voting-rights-due-to-a-felony-conviction/ [https://perma.cc/LV4F-3ZA6]. 
 5. Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, 
and Puerto Rico:  April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://files.hawaii.gov/ 
dbedt/census/popestimate/2019_state_pop_hi/nst-est2019-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TSS-
FADD] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). 
 6. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 16. 
 7. Id. at 17. 
 8. See Geoff Mulvihill, Political Money in State-Level Campaigns Exceeds $2B, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 1, 2018), https://apnews.com/ 
b3ead0614b664bd89fbe1c8c19c42131 [https://perma.cc/KVY4-APGG]. 
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ensures that only elites can afford to run or win elections.9  Once in office, 
representatives are nearly impossible to remove, even as they consistently act 
solely in the interests of economic elites.10  The views of ordinary citizens 
have little to no effect on the laws by which they are governed.11 
What is rotting is the foundation of republican government in the states—
through modern-day manifestations of aristocratic governing tactics that 
subvert popular control of government and create stark levels of political 
inequality amongst citizens.  In particular, the sum processes of widespread 
voter suppression, political entrenchment, unresponsive governance, and 
undemocratic ploys to subvert majoritarian rule are eroding republican 
structures and allowing aristocratic rule to fester in its place.  This is a period 
of decay that rivals the worst episodes of republican crisis in American 
history. 
When confronted with a similarly egregious period of republican rot in the 
wake of the Civil War, a reformist Congress embraced a radical idea to 
deconstruct and reconstitute the foundations of American democracy in the 
states.  It used a little remembered power, thereafter forgotten again, to enact 
a sweeping program of political and constitutional reconstruction.  Article 
IV, Section 4 of the Constitution12—the Guarantee Clause—was Congress’s 
sledgehammer against unrepublican practices and its scalpel for sculpting a 
new political equality.  Under this authority, Congress fundamentally 
reconstituted both the state and federal structures of political power, 
including by dismantling the Southern states’ governments, requiring new 
state constitutions, and orchestrating the ratification of the Fourteenth13 and 
Fifteenth Amendments.14 
It is now time for another major republican renovation of state 
governments.  The country is again at that same tumultuous crossroad of 
severe republican rot, extreme partisan polarization, a legitimization crisis, 
and constitutional gridlock that attended the postwar Reconstruction era.  It 
is therefore imperative in this moment to refocus attention on the 
Constitution’s buried reset button:  the Guarantee Clause. 
Understanding how to use this power is of utmost importance and yet 
critically underexamined.  This Article presents a needed analysis of the 
clause’s modern salience and modes of application.  Relying on text, purpose, 
 
 9. See Richard V. Reeves & Nathan Joo, The Glass Barrier to the Upper Middle Class 
Is Hardening, BROOKINGS INST. (May 11, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-
mobility-memos/2016/05/11/the-glass-barrier-to-the-upper-middle-class-is-hardening/ 
[https://perma.cc/92XL-SFQ8] (citing studies showing increasing class stratification, 
multidimensional poverty, and the unavailability of class mobility). 
 10. See Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases:  Original Mistakes and Current 
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 113 (2000). 
 11. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:  
Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSPS. ON POL. 564, 565 (2014). 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 13. Id. amend. XIV. 
 14. Id. amend. XV; see Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 
4:  A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 540–41 (1962); G. Edward 
White, Reading the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 787, 801 (1994). 
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and historical use, it reveals three enforcement schemes, each with their own 
limits:  (1) direct federal legislation, (2) congressional incentives—through 
the carrot of monetary inducements as well as the stick of refusing to seat 
uncooperative states’ representatives in Congress—and (3) dissolving a state 
government and convening a state constitutional convention to replace it. 
The guarantee power is thus a strikingly direct and potent authority for 
remediating republican rot in the states—and therefore for remedying 
political dysfunction at the federal level as well.  In our federalist system of 
government, the republican health of the states determines the democratic 
vitality of the federal system as a whole.15  It is the states that are the 
structural building blocks of federal political power.  State delegations 
comprise both legislative chambers of Congress.  In the Senate, these 
delegations serve a gatekeeping function for federal judicial and officer 
confirmations.16  State governments have the prerogative to decide whether 
to abide by most major federal policies, including education standards, 
antidiscrimination laws, health care and welfare programs, and even 
immigration policies.17  Upon opting in to federal policies and programs, 
state governments then largely administer them through state and local 
agencies.  Even the president, ostensibly a nationally elected official, is 
selected via a state ballot system fully within the control of each state’s 
legislature.18 
This composite state design of the national government ensures that 
unrepublican practices at the state level lead to unrepublican outcomes at the 
federal level.  The obviousness of this truism should not mask the magnitude 
of its consequences.  In just the last two decades, republican rot in the states 
has directly caused the undemocratic election of dozens of congressmembers 
 
 15. The relationship between republicanism and democracy is rich and complex and quite 
beyond the scope of this Article.  Suffice it to explain here that republican systems of 
government help to ensure democratic rule by fostering popular input in and control over 
government. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 10, at 115 (stating that “the values of democratic 
accountability and majority rule . . . are at the heart of republican government”). 
 16. See Carl Tobias, Senate Blue Slips and Senate Regular Order, YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
INTER ALIA, 2018, at 1, 1–2. 
 17. For example, adherence to federal education standards is optional under the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the nation’s premier public education law. 
See 20 U.S.C. § 7371.  The same is true for participation in Medicaid, which operates as a 
voluntary federal-state partnership and permits states wide flexibility in determining covered 
populations, covered services, health care delivery models, and methods for paying physicians 
and hospitals.  Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which mandates equality in 
educational institutions, is similarly an opt-in law tied to the receipt of federal funding for 
schools. See id. §§ 1681–1688.  Recently, certain localities described as “sanctuary cities” 
have refused to cooperate with the federal government’s immigration policies, showing how 
even areas of law under complete federal control are reliant on state buy-in. See Colleen Long, 
Immigration Agency Subpoenas Sanctuary City Law Enforcement, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 
15, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ba19871e3754e9c4c9838bd3b600154e 
[https://perma.cc/YNP9-7PD3]. 
 18. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320 (2020) (holding states may bind 
electors to vote for the candidate the state legislature chooses). 
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and a U.S. president.19  On the environment, taxes, health care, gun control, 
immigration, reproductive rights, and countless other vital issues, the will of 
the majority is flouted by intransigent states suffering republican rot.20 
To reform the whole, it is now necessary to reform the parts; to protect 
popular interests nationally, it is necessary to improve political institutions 
locally.  At bottom, big structural policy reforms are not possible without 
foundational structural political reforms.  This is the constitutional task of 
our era. 
The republican rot infecting the states is severe.  Republican rot describes 
corrosion of the two pillars of republican government:  popular sovereignty 
and equal citizenship.21  These core principles locate all sovereignty in the 
people and require political power to be equally distributed amongst them.  
Commitment to these principles defines American republicanism and 
distinguishes it from the aristocratic forms of government the Constitution 
eschews.  There are many design variations to republican government, and 
American republicanism itself has certainly never fully lived up to both 
commitments.  Vast levels of political inequality, oppression, and 
disenfranchisement throughout our history reveal both cruel defiance and 
myopic miscalculations over exactly which people are sovereign and equal.  
But the nation’s irregular or failing commitment to these principles does not 
undermine their place as the defining, if aspirational, cornerstones of 
republican government. 
Yet, increasingly, many states are embracing forms of government that 
stray, if not outright flout, these principles.  This rotting of equal popular 
sovereignty is causing states to abandon republican values and erect 
oligarchical power structures that disenfranchise significant portions of their 
citizenries.  They are proliferating electoral and governing systems designed 
to advantage the few and remain unaccountable to the many.  Worse, the 
decay of equal popular sovereignty is quickening as it feeds off of the divisive 
energy of extreme partisan polarization. 
 
 19. In 2000, Florida purged thousands of properly registered citizens from its voting roles, 
blocking their ability to vote in the U.S. presidential election. See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., 
VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:  EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY (2001), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/exesum.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/WNH7-MQ5E].  The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights estimates that the purge cost 
5000 votes for Al Gore. See id. ch. 5.  George Bush ultimately won Florida by a margin of 537 
votes. David Barstow & Don van Natta Jr., How Bush Took Florida:  Mining the Overseas 
Absentee Vote, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2001/07/15/us/examining-the-vote-how-bush-took-florida-mining-the-overseas-absentee-
vote.html [https://perma.cc/46GZ-G92E]. 
 20. See, e.g., ALEX TAUSANOVITCH ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, HOW PARTISAN 




 21. See infra Part I.C.  Professor Jack Balkin describes a similar and broader phenomenon 
he terms “constitutional rot.” See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot, in CAN IT HAPPEN 
HERE?:  AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA 19, 19 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018). 
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The statistics flagged at the outset of this Article present snapshots of this 
unrepublican reality for millions of Americans.  Those snapshots describe 
only two of many unrepublican practices accelerating the demise of 
republicanism across the country:  partisan gerrymandering and the 
disenfranchisement of individuals with criminal convictions.22  Both of these 
practices deny sovereignty to the full polis and privilege an elite class with 
outsize political influence over the composition and decisions of government.  
Partisan gerrymandering subverts the core tenet of popular sovereignty that 
the ruled choose their rulers and devalues the political participation of some 
citizens while elevating that of others.  Likewise, criminal 
disenfranchisement excludes a significant percentage of the citizenry from 
full and equal participation in self-government.  These are not the only 
badges and incidents of unrepublican rule, but they are two of the more 
widespread and egregious. 
The Constitution envisioned such a crisis of popular sovereignty and 
expressly granted the federal government the authority and the obligation to 
act.  Consistent with its general approach of protecting rights through power 
as opposed to parchment, Article IV, Section 4 bestows a power on the 
federal government to ensure republican government in the states.23  It 
provides, simply, that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government.”24  It does not grant an 
individual right to state republican government per se but rather the federal 
means of securing republican government in the states as that concept 
evolves. 
A republican form of government complies with the bedrock principles of 
popular sovereignty and equal citizenship.  These criteria are best understood 
through contraposition.  A “republican form of government” under the 
Guarantee Clause is a government that eschews any expression of aristocratic 
rule.25  Aristocracy is the contrasting touchstone to republicanism under the 
clause.  Aristocracy is a hereditarily entrenched, politically imbalanced, and 
economically unequal style of government.  A state that embraces these 
forms of government has abandoned its republican form and opened itself up 
to federal intervention under the Guarantee Clause.  Practices like partisan 
gerrymandering and criminal disenfranchisement are modern manifestations 
 
 22. A third practice that undoubtedly corrupts the relationship between the people and 
their rulers by privileging the political power of wealthy individuals and subverting 
constituents’ control over and access to their representatives is the level of money in politics.  
The current campaign finance regime is, therefore, also a driver of republican rot.  However, 
unlike other causes of rot, like partisan gerrymandering and criminal disenfranchisement, 
reforming this practice would require an extremely robust exercise of the Guarantee Clause, 
such as that discussed in Part III.C, infra, and implicates difficult free speech and democratic 
participation questions.  For these reasons, it makes practical as well as prudential sense to 
begin remediating the republican rot in the states through politically and constitutionally 
simpler reforms.  That said, the relationship between campaign finance reform and the 
Guarantee Clause is fertile ground for further scholarly work. 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See infra Part I. 
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of old aristocratic practices:  they unequally place power in the hands of the 
few and serve to entrench a political class of economic elites.  They are 
exactly the type of republican rot the Guarantee Clause authorizes Congress 
to address. 
This Article argues that Congress should exercise its authority under the 
Guarantee Clause to pass a sweeping program of republican reforms.  
Congress should use all means available to it under the clause to accomplish 
this goal:  it should legislate against unrepublican practices, create individual 
remedies for the denial of political process rights, offer monetary incentives 
for states to pass republican reforms, sharpen that incentive by denying 
unrepublican state representatives admittance to Congress, and if necessary, 
dismantle and reconfigure recalcitrant state governments clasping to severely 
unrepublican rule.  Such a reform program would include outlawing 
unrepublican practices like partisan gerrymandering and incentivizing the 
passage of state voter protection and enfranchising laws.  It would also 
involve incentivizing states to ratify new constitutional amendments 
addressing the Electoral College, unequal representation in the Senate, and 
an affirmative right to vote and partake equally in democratic processes.  In 
essence, Congress should embark on a second Reconstruction. 
This Article thus bridges two bodies of scholarship:  the study of political 
process rights and the analysis of the Guarantee Clause.  It uses each to fill 
gaps in the other.  Scholars of political process rights recognize the deep 
structural problems with disenfranchisement, entrenchment, and the 
anticompetitive lockup of democratic processes.26  They also recognize the 
relative inaptitude of courts to remedy these structural deficiencies.27  But 
the reforms they advocate are often piecemeal and their analyses are largely 
siloed within conventional legal divisions, such as election law, public 
corruption, or equal protection law.28  The scholarship has not produced a 
grand legislative vision or constitutional strategy for renovating the system. 
Guarantee Clause scholarship suffers the opposite infirmity.  It has 
identified a grand mechanism for reform but would wield it for limited ends 
and through ineffective means.  This body of scholarship is preoccupied with 
the outer limits of what a “republican form of government” might require and 
 
 26. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:  Partisan 
Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998); Michael J. Klarman, The 
Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991); Daryl Levinson 
& Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400 (2015); see 
also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 357–64 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting some 
structural harms that inhere in partisan gerrymandering). 
 27. See Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket:  The Court, Election Law, and 
the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 504 (2004); Levinson & Sachs, supra note 
26, at 417; Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 
293–94 (2014). 
 28. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW:  JUDGING 
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 7–10 (2003) (voting rights lens); Gerken, 
supra note 27, at 517–18 (election law analysis); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 713 
(antitrust framework); Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means, 85 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1698–
99 (1999) (market analysis). 
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is fixated on operatizing the clause’s potential through the courts.29  Both 
strands of argument are premised on underexamined assumptions.  The first 
argument assumes that the original anti-aristocracy function of the clause is 
anachronistic, and the second argument presumes that courts are the best 
constitutional actors for enforcing constitutional rights.  Neither is tenable in 
the context of the Guarantee Clause.  By looking straight past the clause’s 
primary function, scholars miss its contemporary utility for reforming state 
political practices that impose de facto modern-day aristocratic rule on their 
citizens.  And by focusing so intently on the clause’s justiciability, scholars 
have not paused to consider the federal courts’ relative incompetence to 
vindicate structural political rights.  Thus, whereas political process theorists 
do not recognize violations of structural political rights as aristocratic, 
Guarantee Clause scholars do not view the clause’s core anti-aristocracy 
function as salient for addressing modern breakdowns in democratic 
processes. 
This Article stiches these two parallel bodies of study into a cohesive 
constitutional strategy for enacting a program of structural political reform.  
It resurrects the forgotten function of the Guarantee Clause to prohibit 
aristocratic rule, illuminates the salience of this function of the clause in 
today’s political landscape, and offers several constitutional paths forward 
for Congress to restructure political processes and protect structural rights.  
It thus establishes a missing link between theories of constitutional change 
and theories of political reform to design a program of federal legislative 
intervention to excise republican rot from the states. 
In so doing, this Article makes two necessary contributions to the literature 
on the Guarantee Clause.  First, it resurfaces the main purpose of the clause 
as guarding against aristocratic rule in the states and shows how states are 
operating in violation of this seminal prohibition today.  Specifically, the sum 
processes of political entrenchment, voter suppression, and plutocratic 
corruption so excessively and unequally depress popular control of 
government that they are transforming state governments into modern-day 
 
 29. See, e.g., JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 241–42 (2011); WILLIAM WIECEK, THE 
GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 287–89 (1972); Akhil Reed Amar, The 
Central Meaning of Republican Government:  Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the 
Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 753–54 (1994); Bonfield, supra note 14, at 
560; Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 849, 864–69 (1994); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State 
Autonomy:  Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70–78 (1988); Fred O. 
Smith Jr., Due Process, Republicanism, and Direct Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 582, 648–
53 (2014); Jacob M. Heller, Note, Death by a Thousand Cuts:  The Guarantee Clause 
Regulation of State Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1711, 1749–52 (2010); Jarret A. Zafran, 
Comment, Referees of Republicanism:  How the Guarantee Clause Can Address State 
Political Lockup, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1418, 1446–49 (2016); cf. ELY, supra note 26, at 118; 
Mark C. Alexander, Campaign Finance Reform:  Central Meaning and a New Approach, 60 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 825–27 (2003) (cautioning against justiciability); Richard L. 
Hasen, Leaving the Empty Vessel of “Republicanism” Unfulfilled:  An Argument for the 
Continued Nonjusticiability of Guarantee Clause Cases, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION 
DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 75, 85 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah 
& Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007) (arguing against judicial review of Guarantee Clause legislation). 
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aristocracies.  Two specific unrepublican practices this Article explores are 
partisan gerrymandering and the disenfranchisement of individuals with 
criminal convictions. 
Second, this Article details for the first time exactly how the Guarantee 
Clause may be constitutionally enforced against unrepublican state practices, 
without resort to the use of force and occupation that attended the restoration 
of republican government during Reconstruction.  It provides a sorely 
missing defense of the unconventional position that Congress, and not the 
U.S. Supreme Court, is the best-suited and most likely institution to exercise 
the guarantee power to restore republican government.  In the most recent 
exposition of the clause, Ryan Williams began to push back on the 
overwhelming support for the clause’s justiciability by locating the origins 
of the clause in a diplomatic commitment more properly assigned to the 
political branches.30  Where his analysis stops, however—and where this 
Article in part picks up—is explaining how Congress may constitutionally 
fulfill this commitment in a domestic, federalist system.  In this way, this 
Article opens a more fertile opportunity for examining the substantive 
dimensions of a second reconstruction program. 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I retraces the core meaning and 
historical use of the Guarantee Clause as supplying Congress with the 
authority to prevent aristocratic rule in the states, and it explains the specific 
features of aristocracy that are antithetical to republican government.  The 
analysis concludes that political practices that violate the foundational 
principles of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship are fundamentally 
aristocratic in nature and are therefore subject to federal intervention under 
the Guarantee Clause. 
Part II shows that, contrary to widespread assumption, this anti-aristocracy 
purpose of the Guarantee Clause is not at all obsolete.  In reality, many states 
are increasingly adopting aristocratic forms of government through an 
interrelated web of voter suppression, entrenchment, and corrupt oligarchical 
forms of government.  This part examines two such practices—partisan 
gerrymandering and criminal disenfranchisement—as examples of modern 
manifestations of aristocratic rule that are ripe for federal intervention under 
the Guarantee Clause. 
Part III explores, for the first time, exactly how Congress may exercise the 
guarantee power.  It explains that the clause permits Congress to legislate 
directly against unrepublican state practices, incentivize states to adopt 
political process reforms under the spending and seating powers, and 
dissolve a state government and convene a state constitutional convention.  
This part also begins to address the important and diverse limits on 
 
 30. Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602, 611, 679–87 
(2018) (investigating the meaning of the clause’s instruction that the United States “guarantee” 
a republican form of government and concluding that the power resembles a quasi-diplomatic 
commitment adapted from treaty practice, which supports the federal courts’ reluctance to 
treat the clause as nonjusticiable). 
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Congress’s guarantee power when pursuing each of these enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Finally, Part IV defends the uncommon position that enforcement of the 
guarantee is best left to Congress, not the federal courts.  Congress is the 
most institutionally competent branch for this task and, as the most politically 
self-interested branch, is the most likely to address republican crises, which 
present feasible opportunities for politically advantageous reforms.  At the 
same time, Congress is subject to the most robust internal and external 
checks, including constitutional and parliamentary requirements for acting, 
executive and judicial overrides, frequent elections, popular opinion, and 
mass mobilization.  This combination of incentives and limits creates a 
default position of inaction coupled with a high likelihood of intervention in 
periods of genuine crisis.  In contrast to Congress, the federal courts are ill-
equipped to address political process failures and unlikely to act precisely in 
moments of crisis.  The Supreme Court has underdeveloped doctrinal tools 
for protecting structural rights and lacks the institutional design to 
legitimately and effectively interfere in state political processes.  A 
protracted history of poor judicial protection for political process rights, 
which this part briefly outlines, simply confirms the Court’s unsuitability for 
this task. 
Ultimately, this Article reaffirms that the political dysfunction in this 
country, while seemingly boundless in scope, is not endless in time.  This 
current period of intense partisan divide and republican rot echoes the major 
cycles of political breakdown and rebuilding of the past.  Prior 
reconstructions enabled the federal government to adapt and survive by 
ushering in political reforms to its composite parts:  the states.  These periods 
of reconstruction make clear that when norms of democratic governance are 
shattered, it becomes necessary to shatter other norms to restore republican 
government.  This Article provides the blueprint for how. 
I.  A GUARANTEE AGAINST ARISTOCRACY 
The Constitution’s directive that the United States guarantee a 
“Republican Form of Government” to every state endows the federal 
government with the authority to prevent states from adopting aristocratic 
forms of government.  This meaning of the clause is uncontroversial.  
Scholars of all stripes agree that whatever else the clause might mean, it 
clearly empowers the federal government to prevent aristocracy in the 
states.31  Though there is ample disagreement as to how far beyond the 
 
 31. See WIECEK, supra note 30, at 62–63 (“In the clause’s negative thrust, it was designed 
to prohibit monarchical or aristocratic institutions in the states.”); Alexander, supra note 29, 
at 773 (“In designing a new governmental structure, the Framers specifically rejected two 
forms, monarchy and aristocracy.”); Amar, supra note 29, at 764 (“Republicanism must be 
defined as against aristocracy and monarchy.”); Merritt, supra note 29, at 25, 35 n.194 (noting 
that the Guarantee Clause plainly restricts the freedom of the states . . . [to] establish a 
monarchy, a dictatorship, or any other form of government inconsistent with popular 
representation,” that the “original impulse behind the clause might have been a desire to 
protect the states from the dangers of aristocratic government,” and that the ultimate adoption 
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prevention of monarchy and aristocracy the clause reaches, even the most 
prolific defenders of a narrow interpretation of the guarantee power agree it 
includes the authority to prevent the adoption of aristocratic forms of 
government in the states.32  This meaning inexorably comports with the text 
and history of the clause, its common understanding at the founding, the 
structure of the Constitution and the federalist system it erects, as well as 
evolving standards of constitutional rights and norms. 
This overwhelming consensus has worked a sleight of hand, however.  The 
inconvertibleness of the Guarantee Clause’s anti-aristocracy function has lent 
it an aura of inconsequentiality.  It is regularly dismissed as archaic and, even 
worse, has seduced some scholars into discarding the entire guarantee power 
as anachronistic—a relic of another era condemned to constitutional 
irrelevance.  But it is a mistake to dismiss the clause’s anti-aristocracy 
meaning as antiquated or irrelevant.  Properly understood, the clause’s anti-
aristocracy function remains both a supremely potent and pertinent authority. 
Aristocracy and republican government are the flip sides of the same coin.  
Examining our politics through the lens of aristocracy, however, offers 
distinct advantages.  First, by focusing on the inverse of republican 
government, it is easier to delineate the practices that stray away from it.  
Searching for forms of aristocracy in our politics provides a clearer method 
of identifying obviously unrepublican state practices.  Second, by reading the 
clause according to its widely accepted definition, debate over its 
contemporary application can move beyond theoretical arguments over the 
meaning of “republican government” to concrete analyses of which state 
practices run afoul of the guarantee.  While the outer-bound definitions of “a 
republican form of government” are far from settled, the scholarly focus on 
the clause’s possible interpretations has left the settled meaning of the clause 
understudied and underappreciated.  Of course, the debate may simply shift 
to arguments over the meaning of “aristocracy,” but there is less risk of 
quagmire in this debate as the historical definition of English “aristocracy” 
is narrower and more precise than the phrase “republican form of 
government.”  The clause’s purpose and ultimately its potential, therefore, 
are best fulfilled by returning to its central meaning and applying its dictates 
to today’s democratic shortcomings. 
This part traces the anti-aristocratic meaning of the clause and relies on its 
origins and history, set against republican theory, to drill down on exactly 
what an anti-aristocracy guarantee protects against.  It first retraces how, 
under every primary methodological tool of constitutional interpretation, the 
Guarantee Clause bestows on the federal government the power to eliminate 
aristocratic forms of government in the states.  The plain meaning of the text, 
 
of the “broader language” to secure “republican government” refers to more than just the 
danger of “incipient aristocracy”); Williams, supra note 30, at 652 (“Virtually all supporters 
of the Constitution who spoke publicly about the provision’s scope insisted that it would 
provide a ground for federal intervention only in situations involving the most extreme forms 
of deviation from republican principles—meaning the erection of a hereditary monarchy, 
despotism, or (perhaps) aristocracy within a state.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Merritt, supra note 29, at 25. 
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now and according to its ordinary public meaning at the time of ratification, 
points directly to the clause’s anti-aristocracy meaning; and this textual 
interpretation then fully comports with all evidence of the Framers’ intent in 
drafting the clause, as well as how the clause was subsequently used by the 
Reconstruction Congress generations thereafter.  This analysis ultimately 
makes clear that a “republican form of government,” when properly 
understood as the opposite of an aristocratic form of government, at 
minimum, means a government premised on equal, popular sovereignty. 
A.  The Guarantee Clause’s Anti-aristocracy Origins 
In the founding period, both the Framers and the American public broadly 
understood the concept of republican government in diametric terms:  it was, 
simply put, the opposite of monarchy, aristocracy, and despotism.33  These 
latter forms of government had a monopoly on the governing structures of 
nation-states, and they were the sole points of reference against which 
American political philosophies evolved and the Constitution was drafted, 
evaluated, and ultimately ratified. 
The idea for the Guarantee Clause sprung from James Madison’s 
intertwined preoccupations with federal impotence under the Articles of 
Confederation to both rebuff foreign interference and to quell domestic 
violence in the states.  In his April 8, 1787, letter to Virginia governor 
Edmund Randolph, which contained the original blueprint for the Virginia 
Plan, Madison recognized both the need to “expressly guarantee[] the 
tranquillity of the States against internal as well as external dangers” and the 
danger “that, unless the Union be organized efficiently on republican 
principles, innovations of a much more objectionable form may be 
obtruded.”34  Thinking about these two concepts in tandem was common at 
the time.35  Drawing from Montesquieu’s observation that a monarchy 
established in one state will tend to subvert the freedoms enjoyed in a 
neighboring state, the founders viewed the proliferation of monarchical or 
aristocratic elements in any state as a security threat to the liberties of the 
people of all states.36 
The Virginia Plan submitted to the Constitutional Convention fused 
responses to these two concerns by proposing an article “[resolving] that a 
republican government . . . ought to be guaranteed by the United States to 
each state.”37  This clause underwent minor revisions and debate over the 
course of the summer, as proxy battles between the small and large states 
 
 33. WIECEK, supra note 29, at 17. 
 34. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 336, 340 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).  This letter contained 
Madison’s thoughts on necessary reforms and became the basis of the Virginia Plan submitted 
to the Constitutional Convention in May 1787. See Merritt, supra note 29, at 29–30. 
 35. See Merritt, supra note 29, at 29–31. 
 36. Cf. Williams, supra note 30, at 628–29. 
 37. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 22 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
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over other clauses dominated.38  In the wake of the first small-state onslaught 
against the Virginia Plan in late June 1787, the clause was reformulated by 
Madison and approved by unanimous vote to read:  “Resol[ved] . . . ‘That a 
Republican Constitution & its existing laws ought to be guaranteid to each 
State by the U. States.’”39  A second adopted iteration broke out the twin 
purposes of the clause more clearly, resolving that “a Republican form of 
Governmt. shall be guarantied to each State & that each State shall be 
protected [against] foreign & domestic violence.”40  In the Committee on 
Detail, Governor Randolph’s outline for the Constitution’s draft further 
teased out the clause’s distinct purposes:  “1.  to prevent the establishment of 
any government, not republican:  2.  to protect each state against internal 
commotion: and 3.  against external invasion.”41  James Wilson restyled the 
clause to its current formulation, which was approved with minor changes 
and no debate.42  It was placed as the fourth section of the fourth article, 
which reads:  “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against 
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when 
the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”43 
The ratified text quite clearly captures the Framers’ supposed intent.44  It 
plainly establishes a source of federal authority to protect against aristocratic 
usurpations of state government.  The clause obligates the United States to 
“Guarantee” to each state a “Republican Form of Government.”  The verb 
guarantee, as customarily used in treaty practice at the time, signifies an 
obligation and authority for one sovereign to intervene and enforce a 
preestablished right existing between two other sovereign entities—here, the 
states and the sovereign people of those states.45  The word “form” relates to 
the structure of government, which concerns where power resides and how it 
is exercised.  A republican form of government is one that is comprised of 
representatives drawn from and accountable to the public, as opposed to an 
aristocratic form, which is comprised of nobles dependent on hereditary lines 
of power.46  To be sure, the word “form,” as used here, is not so synonymous 
with structure to the point it eschews any concern for substance; rather, 
“form” would have been understood to mean “kind” or “sort,” indicating that 
 
 38. See WIECEK, supra note 29, at 52–54. 
 39. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 37, at 47. 
 40. Id. at 48–49. 
 41. 4 id. at 49. 
 42. See 2 id. at 459, 578, 621. 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 44. That is, their self-articulated intent as can best be gleaned from the historical record 
available. See infra notes 106–23, 134–35 and accompanying text. 
 45. Williams, supra note 30, at 615–20. 
 46. See Fred O. Smith Jr., Awakening the People’s Giant:  Sovereign Immunity and the 
Constitution’s Republican Commitment, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1941, 1955–56 (2012). 
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the clause guarantees a republican system of government whose function and 
output align with republican principles.47 
The clause’s placement in Article IV, Section 4, alongside clauses 
protecting against invasion and domestic violence, further underscores its 
central purpose of preventing aristocratic rule in the states.  Section 4 is, in 
every way, aimed at protecting against aristocratic usurpation.  The foreign 
nations presenting a threat of invasion at the time were all monarchical 
aristocracies.  Additionally, the founders deeply believed that internal 
insurrection invariably led to anarchy, counterinsurgency, or military coup—
all of which generated fertile grounds for the installment of a monarch and 
ruling class.48 
More broadly, Article IV is devoted to intrastate relations and is the only 
place in the 1788 Constitution that delineates rights individuals hold against 
the states.  The first two sections contain the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause—all of 
which order individuals’ relationships to the states.  A guarantee of 
republican government similarly protects the political process rights of 
individuals in each state and directs an important element of intrastate 
relations by foreclosing the threat of an aristocratic coup migrating across 
state lines.49 
The historical evolution and use of the clause paint a similarly 
incontrovertible picture of a power intended to thwart and undo aristocratic 
innovations in the states.  Though its place in constitutional history is 
relatively small—having been sidelined by lack of enforcement and the 
adoption of other civil and political constitutional rights—it is anything but 
insignificant. 
To begin, it played some role in ratifying the Constitution, with proponents 
of ratification invariably describing the clause in anti-aristocracy terms.  
Such a description would have appealed to skeptics on both sides by ensuring 
that the proposed Constitution was both sufficiently rights protective, despite 
lacking a bill of rights, and sufficiently federalist in limiting federal 
intervention to preventing aristocracy.50  James Iredell explained to the North 
Carolina ratifying convention that the clause would empower the federal 
government to guarantee “that no state should have a right to establish an 
aristocracy or monarchy.”51  In newspapers, advocates identified the clause’s 
 
 47. See Bonfield, supra note 14, at 530 (arguing that founding-era courts would have 
understood “form” to mean “kind” or “sort,” based on the purpose of Article IV, Section 4 
and existing definitions of the word). 
 48. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 95–96 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003) 
(“A guarantee by the national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations of 
rulers, as against the ferments and outrages of faction and sedition in the community.”); see 
also WIECEK, supra note 29, at 49; White, supra note 14, at 797–98. 
 49. See Amar, supra note 29, at 765. 
 50. See Williams, supra note 30, at 652–53, 652 n.308 (noting anti-Federalist concerns 
with the potential for federal intervention under the clause). 
 51. See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 195 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 
1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]. 
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central function as ensuring that state constitutions “cannot be royal forms, 
cannot be aristocratical, but must be republican.”52  Essays, including The 
Federalist Papers, assured the public that the clause was a source of federal 
protection for states “against monarchical or aristocratical encroachments”53 
and a necessary power in “a confederacy founded on republican principles, 
and composed of republican members . . . to defend the system against 
aristocratic or monarchial innovations.”54 
After ratification, the clause was periodically invoked in the early and mid-
nineteenth century as two deeply unrepublican failings came under 
increasing scrutiny.  The first was the severe and violent political subjugation 
of poor laborers.55  This type of political inequality prompted national 
attention on the Guarantee Clause, for the first time, in the 1840s, when small 
property owners in Rhode Island revolted in response to extreme 
malapportionment and disenfranchisement in an episode known as Dorr’s 
Rebellion, which led both President John Tyler and the Supreme Court to 
consider (and decline) federal interference in settling the dispute under the 
Guarantee Clause.56  The second unrepublican failing was the even more 
severe and violent subjugation of enslaved human beings.  But though the 
clause was tailor-made to redress both failings, a fractured and reticent 
federal government on the brink of collapse did not muster the political 
capital to enforce the guarantee until the government did collapse, and all the 
reasons for inaction turned into reasons for intervention. 
B.  The Reconstruction of Slave Aristocracies 
The guarantee power has been used in earnest only once.  It formed the 
constitutional basis for Congress’s reconstruction of the South after the Civil 
War, and indeed, its reconstruction of the entire federalist system.  It is 
largely understood that the Guarantee Clause justified this program because 
chattel slavery is deeply incompatible with basic republican values.  But that 
is not the full story.  The Guarantee Clause was such a natural fit for 
reconstructing the South because the task involved more than abolishing 
slavery.  It required dismantling and replacing an entire political slave 
 
 52. Tench Coxe, An American Citizen:  An Examination of the Constitution of the United 
States (pt. 3), INDEP. GAZETTEER, Sept. 29, 1788, reprinted in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION:  
WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS, 1787–1788, at 466, 470 (Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary 
L. McDowell eds., 1998). 
 53. Plain Truth, Reply to an Officer of the Late Continental Army, INDEP. GAZETTEER, 
Nov. 10, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 216, 218 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
 54. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 48, at 211 (James Madison). 
 55. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 371 (2005); Amar, 
supra note 29, at 778.  See generally WIECEK, supra note 29, at 78–110 (discussing the 
clause’s invocations in Shays’s Rebellion, the Whiskey Rebellion, Dorr’s Rebellion, and the 
“Bleeding Kansas” civil war). 
 56. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 40 (1849).  For additional discussion of this 
episode and how it informs the modern applicability of the Guarantee Clause to partisan 
gerrymandering, see infra Part II.A. 
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economy, a task on all fours with the core purpose of the clause to expel 
aristocratic forms of government in the states. 
American slavery was many horrendous things; and one of these things 
was a network of slave aristocracies.  Aristocracy is a form of government in 
which power is held by a class of noble citizens, whose membership in that 
class entitles them to hereditary rights of power and property.  It is 
government by the “well-born” and generally describes a political economy 
in which the noble and common classes are bonded in property relationships.  
In particular, an aristocracy’s nobility has rights to the economic output of 
nonnoble citizens, who are entitled to fewer social and political rights than 
their rulers. 
So too in the American slave states.  Slave governments embraced a form 
of government in which power was held by a class of white nobility, whose 
membership in this hereditary, racial caste entitled them to rights and powers 
under law that were denied slaves and racial minorities.  It was government 
by the “well-born,” as slave and master status were determined by birth.  And 
it comprised a political economy defined by property relationships between 
human beings of different hereditary castes, where white masters were 
legally entitled to all the economic output of their Black slaves—even their 
children—while slaves had virtually no social, political, or legal rights of 
their own.  If anything, slavery was racial aristocracy on steroids. 
Abolitionists began making the connection between slavery and 
republicanism in the late 1830s, invoking the Guarantee Clause with 
increasing frequency for the argument that slavery, as an institution, is 
incompatible with republican government.  In particular, these antislavery 
advocates began formulating a theory of abolition based on the principle of 
popular sovereignty, arguing that slavery eviscerated this necessary pillar of 
republican government in states with a majority or near-majority slave 
population.57 
Theoretical arguments for the abolition of slavery ultimately gave way to 
the practical realities of war.  By spring 1861, eleven states had seceded from 
the Union, kicking off a yearslong humanitarian and constitutional crisis.58  
As war pushed Unionists first to accept and then to demand abolition, federal 
officials endeavored to make constitutional sense of secession and to plan for 
eventual reconciliation and reconstruction.59 
The Guarantee Clause quickly emerged as pivotal to both these projects.  
First, a “state suicide” theory of secession relied on the Guarantee Clause to 
explain how the divided nation nonetheless remained an indivisible Union, 
positing that secession effectively killed the constitutional relationship 
between the rebel state governments and the Union, leaving those states with 
a constitutionally unrecognizable—and therefore unrepublican—form of 
government, exactly what Article IV had anticipated and provided a remedy 
 
 57. WIECEK, supra note 29, at 156–62. 
 58. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 354–55. 
 59. See id. at 355. 
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for.60  Second, forward-looking U.S. senators turned to the Guarantee Clause 
early on in the war effort to envision a concrete plan for postwar 
reconstruction.61  Two competing perspectives emerged.  Senator Ira Harris, 
a conservative Republican, proposed empowering the president to establish 
provisional governments in the rebel states until loyal state governments 
could be organized through new constitutional conventions.62  Senator 
Charles Sumner, a progressive Republican and staunch abolitionist, 
advocated that the federal government administer the rebel states while new 
governments were convened and that Congress evaluate the new states’ 
constitutions and governments for their republican character.63 
Four momentous years—the loss of nearly three-quarters of a million 
Americans,64 the emancipation of slaves, and the reelection and assassination 
of President Abraham Lincoln—left the aristocratic plantation system of the 
South in ashes.  By the summer of 1865, the last Confederate troops had 
surrendered and the ex-rebel states convened state constitutional 
conventions, ratified new state constitutions that repudiated slavery and 
secession, and elected new state legislatures.65  But on December 4, 1865, 
the Thirty-Ninth Congress, convening for the first time, refused to seat any 
of the representatives from the eleven former Confederate states on the basis 
that no legal state governments yet existed in these states because of their 
continued embrace of a political slave aristocracy, including the 
disenfranchisement of their now free Black citizens.66  Whereas President 
Andrew Johnson was content with a strategy of appeasement and transition, 
congressional Republicans were committed not just to peace and rebuilding 
but also to dismantling in earnest the former slave aristocracies of the South 
and reconfiguring the relationship between the Union, the states, and the 
people.67 
The task of developing this grand strategy fell to the newly created Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction, which issued its report the following 
summer.68  The committee labored in a politically fraught environment, as 
simmering tensions between the Republican-led Congress and President 
Johnson erupted into all-out blows over the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
 
 60. See WIECEK, supra note 29, at 176. 
 61. See id. at 179–85. 
 62. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3139–42 (1862) (statement of Sen. Ira Harris); 
see WIECEK, supra note 29, at 179–80. 
 63. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 736–37, 3139 (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner); WIECEK, supra note 29, at 175–77, 181.  For a more detailed history of how the 
Guarantee Clause was utilized by the Republicans in the lead-up to Reconstruction, see id. at 
166–94. 
 64. See J. David Hacker, A Census-Based Count of the Civil War Dead, 57 CIV. WAR 
HIST. 307, 307 (2011). 
 65. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  TRANSFORMATIONS 100–01 (1998). 
 66. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 366. 
 67. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 65, at 19–20. 
 68. JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
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of 186669 and the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act,70 both of which Johnson 
vetoed and Congress eventually overrode to pass into law.  The committee’s 
report presented Congress a prime opportunity to expand its arsenal in the 
fight against President Johnson’s and the Southern states’ push for a speedy 
readmission and a return to the states’ rights model of federalism.71  The final 
report was unequivocal and comprehensive.  It essentially adopted Senator 
Sumner’s proposed constitutional architecture for Reconstruction:  it 
embraced a robust view of the guarantee power, accepted that republican 
government is impossible where a large minority of the adult male population 
is disenfranchised, and claimed for Congress primary responsibility to 
govern Reconstruction.72 
Operating under this framework, Congress set to work transforming the 
Southern governments from slave aristocracies into republics founded on the 
twin principles of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship.  Its first inroad 
was proposing ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment73 in June 1866,74 
which advanced both goals by redefining who was included in the class of 
“sovereign people” (“all persons born or naturalized in the United States”75) 
and conferring equal legal and political rights on every citizen within that 
class.76  But in the wake of continued Southern intransigence and landslide 
Republican victories in the November 1866 congressional elections, 
Congress launched an unprecedentedly forceful and intrusive campaign to 
reform state governments under the Guarantee Clause.77 
The centerpiece of Congress’s campaign to establish republican forms of 
government in the former Confederate states was the First Reconstruction 
Act of 1867.78  The Act declared that no legal state governments or adequate 
protections for life and property existed in ten Confederate states, divided 
these states into five military districts, imposed federal military rule until new 
governments could be formed, empowered the army to compile new voter 
registries that included the male former slaves, and directed the Army to 
convene new state constitutional conventions.79  Under these procedures, 
nearly three-quarters of a million former slaves registered to vote.80  The Act 
also established the conditions for readmission:  each state was required to 
 
 69. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. 
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adopt a new state constitution, under which the people would elect a new 
state legislature, which was required to pass the Fourteenth Amendment.81 
Reconstruction under this formula took a little over a year.  In the summer 
of 1868, Congress determined that seven of the excluded states had 
satisfactorily renounced their slave aristocracies and adopted republican 
forms of government.82  It was through these states’ compliance with the 
imposed conditions for readmission that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified in July 1868.83  When one of these readmitted states, Georgia, then 
expelled all of its duly elected Black state representatives and seated 
nonjuring ex-Confederates in its state legislature, Congress reimposed 
federal military rule and rerevoked the admission of Georgia’s congressional 
delegation.84  It was not until 1870 that Congress passed a bill for the 
reconstruction of Georgia, which mirrored the First Reconstruction Act and 
required passage of the now pending Fifteenth Amendment85 as an additional 
condition of readmission.86  The remaining three states—Virginia, 
Mississippi, and Texas87—were also obliged to ratify the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments as a condition of readmission.88  They did so in the 
early months of 1870 and were promptly readmitted to Congress.89  Virginia, 
Mississippi, and Georgia’s ratifications were among the twenty-eight state 
ratifications necessary for the Fifteenth Amendment to become law. 
C.  The Anti-aristocracy Guarantee Power 
Several conclusions about the meaning of the guarantee power are gleaned 
by reading its text, origins, and historical use in light of its undisputed 
function as a tool for eradicating aristocracy in the states.  In particular, its 
anti-aristocracy function makes clear the clause bestows a prophylactic 
legislative power designed to usher in new legal paradigms of political rights. 
First, the considered decision by the Framers to independently guarantee 
republican government separate and apart from guaranteeing protection 
against foreign invasion and domestic violence indicates the guarantee power 
is prophylactic.  The Guarantee Clause must apply to a state that peaceably 
devolves into aristocracy or monarchy because the foreign invasion and 
domestic violence clauses already cover the violent overthrow of republican 
government.  A state that peaceably abandons republican government likely 
does so incrementally.  Fulfilling the guarantee in the context of incremental 
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(July 13, 1868), and Georgia (July 21, 1868). 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA, 
supra note 77, at 833–35. 
 83. COLEMAN, supra note 80, at 4. 
 84. See WIECEK, supra note 29, at 217–20. 
 85. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 86. See WIECEK, supra note 29, at 219–20. 
 87. AMAR, supra note 55, at 397. 
 88. COLEMAN, supra note 80, at 5; Bonfield, supra note 14, at 541. 
 89. Georgia was not readmitted until July 15, 1870. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
RECONSTRUCTION ERA, supra note 77, at 833. 
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decline would require federal intervention at a point short of the state 
devolving into full aristocracy.  Moreover, the clause is a positive pledge of 
a republican form of government, as opposed to a negative guarantee against 
aristocracy.  The choice is striking given that the other two obligations 
imposed on the United States in the same clause are to protect against 
invasion and domestic violence.  The same negative guarantee in the context 
of protecting republican government would tether federal intervention to the 
realization of a full aristocracy or monarchy in a state.  The text takes the 
opposite tack. 
Second, the anti-aristocracy meaning of the clause confirms a primary role 
for Congress in exercising the guarantee power.  The power to interfere in 
peaceable state political processes is most properly exercised by a legislative 
branch.  The Constitution consistently approves this allocation of power by 
granting Congress authority over intrastate relations, including in the other 
provisions of Article IV.90  At the same time, as Ryan Williams explains at 
length, by empowering the United States to “guarantee” republican 
government, the clause permits the use of force to ensure state compliance 
with republican principles.91  Authorizing the use of force, particularly in the 
domestic context, is a power allocated to Congress in the first instance.92 
Third, viewing the clause as an anti-aristocracy bulwark sheds new light 
on the evolving character of its meaning.  The Framers’ deliberate rejection 
of proposals to guarantee each state’s “territory,” “constitution,” or “laws,” 
indicates the clause does not guarantee states’ original structures of 
government but rather adopts a dynamic conception of republicanism that 
progresses as society evolves.  The Supreme Court’s earliest case law shores 
up this understanding of the clause, as it continuously linked principles of 
republicanism to natural law, which by definition is an evolving standard.93  
But ultimately, it was Reconstruction that resoundingly solidified this 
interpretation of the clause.  War, congressional action, popular 
reaffirmation, and judicial and executive acquiescence all gave fuller 
definition to the meaning of republican government and thereby confirmed 
the evolving nature of that guarantee.  By branding the South’s political slave 
economy as fundamentally unrepublican in 1865, this generation of 
Americans confirmed that the constitutional line between a republican and 
unrepublican form of government is not static but evolves as society 
 
 90. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); id. art. IV, § 1; id. § 3, cl. 
1. 
 91. Williams, supra note 30, at 615. 
 92. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–16 (covering Congress’s powers to declare war, to 
raise armies, to maintain a navy, and to call forth the militia). 
 93. See Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815) (linking republican 
government and the “spirit and the letter of the constitution” to “the principles of natural 
justice”); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143–44 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring) 
(observing that republicanism is dictated by natural justice); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
386, 387–89 (1798) (noting that states, as republican governments, are bound by natural 
justice); Bonfield, supra note 14, at 558–59 (articulating how the concept of republicanism 
was principally informed by natural justice, which inherently is an evolving concept like the 
common law). 
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progresses and gives truer meaning to the principles of popular sovereignty 
and equal citizenship.  In the same vein, this history settled that the 
“sovereign people” entitled to republican government under the clause is a 
term defined according to contemporary democratic norms.94 
Finally, this analysis further elucidates that the proper target of the 
guarantee power is aristocratic structures and political processes.  The text 
guarantees a republican form of government.  The emphasis here on 
governmental structure indicates a preoccupation with preserving political 
process rights—the right and ability to participate in self-government.  And 
though the Framers ultimately rejected the language of guaranteeing each 
state a “republican constitution,” their repeated description of the clause as 
having this effect emphasizes the focus on preserving structural rights.  The 
Reconstruction generation reaffirmed this understanding of the clause’s 
focus by using it primarily to undo structures of power and to protect the 
political process from being corrupted by sedition or unequal representation.  
In so doing, the guarantee power, both in substance and in deed, redefined 
the structural relationship between the federal government and the states. 
The clause’s structural focus and historical use also highlight its place as 
an enforcement power rather than an individual right.  The Reconstruction 
Congress used the Guarantee Clause as the legal mechanism for imposing a 
program of reconstruction on the states; the social and political reforms that 
program aimed to accomplish were sought entirely through the passage of 
new substantive law, including new constitutional law through the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  In other words, the guarantee power 
may reconstitute the law but does not itself supply any legal requirements.  
The difference is significant because Congress’s guarantee power is 
inherently temporal, linked to the extent and duration of a state’s 
nonconformity with a republican form of government.  Substantive law, on 
the other hand—and especially constitutional law—operates in perpetuity 
until overridden or otherwise negated.  The Guarantee Clause was operative 
so long as the Southern states remained unrepublican, but much of the law it 
ushered through remains operative to this day. 
The clause’s uncontroversial anti-aristocracy function thus helps bring out 
the less obvious features of the guarantee power.  In sum, the text, structure, 
history, and evolution of the clause confirm that it confers authority on the 
federal government to prevent aristocratic forms of government from 
 
 94. Women were ultimately denied equal political rights in this reformist era in apparent 
accord with contemporary democratic norms.  The hypocrisy did not go unnoticed and was 
vigorously challenged by women’s rights activists.  The resounding incompleteness of the 
Reconstructionists’ republican reforms, however, does not undermine the use of the Guarantee 
Clause to correct another egregious violation of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship in 
the states, namely the denial of equal rights on account of race.  For compelling histories of 
the failure to correct the separate unrepublican denial of women’s political rights during 
Reconstruction, see generally BERNADETTE CAHILL, NO VOTE FOR WOMEN:  THE DENIAL OF 
SUFFRAGE IN RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA (2019); FAYE E. DUDDEN, FIGHTING CHANCE:  THE 
STRUGGLE OVER WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND BLACK SUFFRAGE IN RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA 
(2011); LAURA E. FREE, SUFFRAGE RECONSTRUCTED:  GENDER, RACE, AND VOTING RIGHTS IN 
THE CIVIL WAR ERA (2015). 
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supplanting the representative relationship between the people and the state 
and to eradicate any such forms that take hold.  To this end, it inevitably 
bestows a prophylactic power on Congress to protect an evolving 
understanding of structural political rights. 
D.  Distinguishing Between Aristocratic and Republican Government 
Having elucidated the Guarantee Clause’s broad protection against 
evolving manifestations of aristocratic rule, the salient features of republican 
government that the clause requires the United States to guarantee are now 
brought into sharper relief.  American republicanism evolved in direct 
contraposition to English aristocracy.  It is therefore possible to trace the line 
between these two forms of government by looking to their points of 
departure.  At its most basic level, the Constitution adopted two core 
innovations from the English system:  it locates all sovereignty in the people 
and distributes power equally among them.95  These two principles—popular 
sovereignty and equal citizenship—are what differentiate a republic from an 
aristocracy in constitutional terms.  A state in violation of either principle 
takes on an aristocratic form and opens itself to federal intervention under 
the Guarantee Clause. 
Popular sovereignty describes a system of self-rule in which government 
derives all its power from the people.  A popular sovereign government is 
one operating with the consent of the people, formed of the people, and 
alterable by a majority of the people.  It differs starkly from aristocratic rule, 
which is premised on power residing perpetually in a small and elite subset 
of the people through heredity.  Equal citizenship is the second cornerstone 
of republican government and refers to the equal distribution of political 
power among the sovereign public.  In a republic, no one person or class of 
people has a greater or lesser claim to political power.  By contrast, political 
power is unevenly distributed in an aristocracy, which entitles a propertied 
nobility to a greater share of the governing authority.96 
Exactly which people constitute these sovereign and equal citizens has 
been the central struggle of republican progress.  By excluding women and 
slaves from the franchise, for example, the founding generation adopted an 
imperfect and quite incomplete republic.  A republic need not locate all 
sovereignty equally in all people, but it must at least locate equal sovereignty 
in those populations capable of self-government and civic participation.  
Determining who is so capable involves a calculus the nation has repeatedly 
botched.  Many generations, either cruelly or myopically, long considered 
women and slaves unfit for civic participation.  This error sowed the seeds of 
war, suffering, and ultimately reform, as society progressed and it became 
 
 95. See White, supra note 14, at 794 (explaining how, in establishing the Constitution, 
Americans relocated sovereignty from the king to the people and built into the essence of 
government the principle of representativeness). 
 96. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 476 (1793) (stating that republican 
government requires equality of popular sovereignty). 
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clear that denying these populations equal participation in government was 
indeed fundamentally unrepublican. 
This calculus was so glaringly wrong by contemporary standards that it is 
hard to describe American democracy as republican at all.  But while we 
rightly fault past generations for erring in their calculus and maintaining a 
halting commitment to republicanism, it is critical to understand that this 
was, and still is, the accepted formula for republican government.  Today, we 
regularly exclude children, noncitizen residents, the severely mentally 
incapacitated, and many with criminal convictions from the franchise based 
on this metric—that in one way or another these populations are unqualified 
participants in self-government.  It is quite possible our current calculus is 
wrong, and I will argue below that for at least one of these populations, it is.  
But whether the founding generation, or indeed contemporary society, has 
succeeded in creating a genuine republic that fully lives up to the principles 
of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship is a separate question from what 
republican government requires and thus, what the Guarantee Clause 
empowers the federal government to require of the states. 
Even as the Constitution was put into effect by an unrepublican republic, 
it is clear from the document and the political philosophy undergirding its 
words that the republican form of government it envisions and demands of 
the states is one in which all power is derived from, and distributed equally 
amongst, the people.  These are the central tenets of republican political 
theory, which supplies the philosophical foundations for the system of 
government established by the Constitution.97 
Republicanism is a political theory that places both sovereignty and 
governing authority in the hands of the people.  From its origins in classical 
Greek and Roman societies, the principle novelty republicanism introduced 
was enlarging the definition of “the people” to include nonnoble 
professionals.  The term derives from the Latin res publica, the thing of the 
people, and continued to be defined in founding-era dictionaries as “placing 
the government in the people.”98  At its core, it is a philosophy of government 
that emphasizes the political participation of citizens for the good of the 
whole.  The Framers were united in their commitment to establishing a 
 
 97. There is widespread scholarly agreement that a republican government requires 
popular rule by a politically equal citizenry. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 29, at 778 
(“[W]hile scholars offer different perspectives and pursue different agendas, popular 
sovereignty is consistently believed to be at the core of the republican form of government.”); 
Amar, supra note 29, at 749 (stating republican government requires “that the structure of 
day-to-day government—the Constitution—be derived from ‘the People’ and be legally 
alterable by a ‘majority’ of them”); Merritt, supra note 29, at 23 (“[W]idespread agreement 
exists among scholars and jurists about the core meaning of republican government . . . .  [as] 
one in which the people control their rulers.”); Smith, supra note 46, at 1954 (“There is broad 
consensus that as a textual matter, ‘republican’ refers at a minimum to popular sovereignty 
and the principle of majority rule.”); Zafran, supra note 29, at 1445 (“For all the different 
conceptions of the Clause’s text, origins, and contemporary meaning, virtually all agree that 
popular control remains central to its guarantee.”). 
 98. 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J. F. & C. 
Rivington 6th ed. 1785). 
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republic, even as they adhered to and fused different strands of republican 
theory to guide them in structuring a republic that could succeed in a diverse 
and geographically expansive nation.99  The hallmark of such a republic was 
necessarily the process of democratic representation.100  The two core 
principles indispensable to representativeness, and thus to American 
republicanism, are popular sovereignty and equal citizenship.101 
One need look no further than the “two great title-deeds of the Republic, 
the Declaration of Independence and the National Constitution,”102 to 
understand how popular sovereignty and equal citizenship define republican 
government in the United States.  The Declaration rests its argument for 
independence on these two precise principles by pronouncing “first, that all 
men are equal in rights, and, secondly, that just government stands only on 
the consent of the governed.”103  The Constitution establishes a federal 
republican system by robustly incorporating the principles of popular 
sovereignty and equal citizenship at multiple levels.  First, the document 
creates overlapping structural mechanisms for ensuring that the government 
reflects the contemporary and composite will of the people.  It establishes 
multiple branches of government, each elected in different ways, by different 
constituencies, at different times, and pursuant to rules established by 
different bodies.104  It then creates an extraordinarily low floor, by 
eighteenth-century standards, for participating in the franchise and for 
holding office, expanding the franchise to a much higher proportion of 
citizens than could vote in England.105  The absence of any property 
requirement for holding office, in particular, significantly widened 
membership eligibility as compared to England, where even membership in 
 
 99. See Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1550, 1558–
64 (1988).  As Sunstein notes, even individually, many of the founders likely embraced and 
drew on commitments to both pluralist and republican thought. See id.  Compare THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 48 (James Madison) (pluralist analysis), with THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 39, supra note 48 (James Madison) (republican lens). 
 100. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 
164–65, 596–600 (1998) (underscoring the central principle of representativeness in 
republican theory); see also BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 161–75 (1967) (same). 
 101. Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1552.  Sunstein writes that republicanism is characterized 
by a commitment to four principles:  popular sovereignty (“citizenship,” in his terms), 
“equality of political actors,” deliberation, and universalism (agreement as the governing 
ideal). See id. at 1539, 1541.  Together, these four principles comprise the foundational aspects 
of a representative system, i.e., a deliberative system, where majoritarian agreement governs, 
founded on the popular sovereignty and equality of political actors. 
 102. Senator Charles Sumner, Admission of Mississippi to Representation in Congress:  
Speech in the Senate (Feb. 17, 1870), reprinted in 13 THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 331, 
333 (Boston, Lee & Shepard 1880). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 38.  This scheme aims to enhance legislative 
representativeness.  In John Adams’s words, a republican legislature “should be in miniature 
an exact portrait of the people at large.  It should think, feel, reason, and act like them.” JOHN 
ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT 195 (Philadelphia, John Dunlap 1776). 
 105. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 13–17. 
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the House of Commons was limited to men of vast estates.106  To further 
disentangle power from the aristocratic pillars of wealth and heredity, the 
Constitution prohibits titles of nobility, makes no distinction of birth,107 
eschews the traditional model of apportioning the upper legislative chamber 
by wealth, and bestows a salary on government members so that common 
citizens can afford to hold office, in stark contrast to the rule in England that 
members of Parliament serve without pay.108 
The few qualifications the Constitution does impose on membership—
residency, age, and citizenship—were themselves designed to advance the 
principles of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship.109  A residency 
requirement guarded against wealthy men from neighboring states seeking 
election after losing in their own states, as was the practice in England.110  
An age requirement limited the risk that young men from wealthy and famous 
families would crowd out more representative members of the community 
from obtaining office.111  The Constitution makes this short list of 
qualifications exclusive to preclude cunning politicians from manipulating 
membership qualifications to diminish or distort the wide stock of eligible 
citizens for office.112  In the end, not just the lower legislative chamber but 
the entire federal government was designed to be “open to merit of every 
description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without 
regard to property or wealth, or to any particular profession or religious 
faith.”113 
Finally, the Reconstruction Amendments fill out the meaning of 
constitutional republicanism and confirm the primacy of popular sovereignty 
and equal citizenship in this form of government.  As discussed, the architects 
of the Reconstruction Amendments crafted those provisions to establish 
 
 106. See generally WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS:  
REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY 
ERA 315–27 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., Rowman & Littlefield rev. ed. 2001) (1973); 
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE:  THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 264 (1988). 
 107. With the glaring exception of sanctioning the hereditary institution of slavery. 
 108. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 9; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; id. art. III, § 1.  There was 
disagreement at the founding whether all property qualifications were strictly incompatible 
with republican government.  Some state constitutions organized their upper bicameral 
chamber by wealth, and Federalist No. 39 referred to England’s House of Commons as a 
“republican branch” within a hereditary aristocracy and monarchy.  However, at the 
Constitutional Convention, specific and frequent proposals for a property qualification for 
membership in the Senate, for Senate positions to be unpaid, and for a property requirement 
to vote were advanced, considered, and ultimately rejected.  As a result, this feature of 
government lost its republican compatibility through the constitution-making process. See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 48, at 182 (James Madison); Chemerinsky, supra note 29, at 
868. 
 109. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 68–70. 
 110. See id. at 70. 
 111. See id. at 70–71. 
 112. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783, 808–09 (1995); Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522, 535 (1969). 
 113. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 48, at 256 (James Madison). 
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republican government in the ex-Confederate states.114  At their core, these 
amendments deal almost exclusively with achieving greater popular 
sovereignty and establishing political equality amongst the newly configured 
citizenry.  By abolishing slavery, granting citizenship and expanding the 
franchise to the freed slaves, and restricting from membership in government 
certain public officials who engaged in rebellion, the Reconstruction 
Amendments recalculated the definition of the “sovereign people” to bring it 
into conformity with contemporary notions of republican civic virtue.  Then, 
by guaranteeing the equal right to vote, the abolition of all badges and 
incidents of slavery, and the equal protection of the laws, the Reconstruction 
Amendments established the conditions for the newly freed slaves to enjoy 
political equality.115 
In all these ways, the Constitution reflects that the central pillars of the 
republican government it establishes are popular sovereignty and equal 
citizenship.  It does not “favor[] the elevation of the few on the ruins of the 
many” but is instead “scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions of 
every class and description of citizens.”116  It is formed by a body of 
politically equal citizens—“not the rich more than the poor; not the learned 
more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more 
than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune . . . .  [but by] the 
great body of the people of the United States.”117  And it is governed by the 
same—by “every citizen whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and 
confidence of his country.  No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious 
faith, or of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint 
the inclination of the people.”118  In short, it is structured as a government of, 
by, and for equally sovereign citizens.119 
During ratification, Madison heralded the synthesis of popular sovereignty 
and equal citizenship as “the genius of Republican liberty” in the United 
States.120  He elaborated on their interconnection, writing in Federalist No. 
39, “It is ESSENTIAL to [a republican] government, that it be derived from 
the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a 
favored class of it . . . .”121  Roger Sherman described republican government 
similarly in a letter to John Adams, explaining that “what especially 
 
 114. See supra Part I.B. 
 115. See Smith, supra note 29, at 639 (collecting quotes linking amendments to 
republicanism). 
 116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 48, at 277–78 (James Madison). 
 117. Id. at 278. 
 118. Id. 
 119. This is not to suggest that the Constitution is not elitist, only that it is not aristocratic.  
The Constitution contains a number of explicitly elitist forms, from the legislative selection of 
senators, to the Electoral College.  These choices reflected a desire to populate the government 
with educated men of a certain stature in society.  But creating incidental advantages for 
political elites is not the same as privileging a favored class with unequal political power.  That 
said, to the extent these constitutional structures run afoul of contemporary notions of popular 
sovereignty and equal citizenship, they are fair targets for reform under the Guarantee Clause. 
See infra Part III.C. 
 120. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 48, at 170 (James Madison). 
 121. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 48, at 182 (James Madison) (emphasis added). 
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denominates [a government] a republic is its dependence on the public or 
people at large, without any hereditary powers.”122  Nearly a century later, 
congressmen attempting to reconstruct Southern slave states into republics 
would identify “liberty, equality before the law, and the consent of the 
governed [as the] essential elements of a republican government.”123 
Accordingly, these two core attributes of republican government are not 
only foundational, they are definitional.  Every other viable model of national 
government to the Framers—of which there were two, monarchy and 
aristocracy—broke with these two principles.124  Popular sovereignty and 
equal citizenship, therefore, describe the meaning of republicanism in as 
much as they define how republicanism differs from aristocracy.  They are 
the distinguishing factors between the two systems of government. 
A republic that ceases to adhere to the principles of popular sovereignty 
and equal citizenship devolves back into an aristocratic form of 
government—and it is precisely these forms of government that the 
Guarantee Clause prohibits.  Put differently, state political processes that 
interfere with popular rule or that favor one political class over another 
amount to aristocratic regressions of the type Congress may proscribe under 
the Guarantee Clause.  Specifically, political processes that strip away 
majority popular control over government in favor of exclusive or entrenched 
control violate the principle of popular sovereignty and cross the line from 
republican to aristocratic.  Similarly, political processes that permit wealthy 
elites a greater share of governing power violate the republican principle of 
equal citizenship and are fundamentally aristocratic.125 
One caveat is necessary here:  there may be other indispensable elements 
of a republican form of government that are not explicitly anti-aristocratic or 
that could easily exist in an aristocratic government.  Such elements might 
include guarantees of due process, transparency, and some separation 
 
 122. Letter from Roger Sherman to John Adams (July 20, 1789), in CHARLES FRANCIS 
ADAMS, WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 4, 437 (Boston, Cambridge Press 1851). 
 123. Letter from Charles Sumner to Francis Lieber (Oct. 12, 1864), in 4 EDWARD L. PIERCE, 
MEMOIR AND LETTERS OF CHARLES SUMNER 258, 259 (Boston, Roberts Bros. 1894). 
 124. Naturally, myriad other forms of government existed and flourished throughout the 
world, particularly indigenous governments, non-European governments, and European city-
states.  The available models for independent, national governments were quite limited, 
though.  Even the Dutch Republic, ostensibly another national republican system, operated as 
a confederation and was functionally ruled by a closed, oligarchical “regent” class and a 
hereditary sovereign (the Stadtholder, Prince of Orange). See Catherine Secretane, “True 
Freedom” and the Dutch Tradition of Republicanism, REPUBLICS OF LETTERS, Dec. 2010, at 
82, 84. 
 125. It bears repeating that this is not to say that popular sovereignty and equal citizenship 
have always entailed full participation in political power.  There has been a constant struggle 
in this country over who counts in the popular citizenship denominator.  Questions of which 
people are sovereign and enjoy equal citizenship have driven the country to war and to 
revolution.  Though full popular sovereignty and full equal citizenship were not contemplated 
by the founders and indeed have not been embraced to this day, the political principles of 
popular sovereignty and equal citizenship were then, and remain now, the central defining 
pillars of a republican form of government. 
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between the executive, legislative, judicial, and military powers.126  Should 
a state discard these precepts, it would run afoul of the Guarantee Clause, 
though it would not necessarily have devolved into an aristocracy.  These 
two forms of government, aristocracy and republic, are not polar opposites, 
despite the founders’ dichotic understanding of the two.  Rather, they are 
successive models in a lineage of political development.  While the 
Guarantee Clause may also prohibit departures from other foundational 
principles of republican government, the point here is only to recall that the 
clause surely and unequivocally bars states from imposing aristocratic rule 
on their citizens—and that, properly understood, this function is not at all 
obsolete.  Our greatest democratic failures as a nation have violated one or 
both of the core principles of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship.  
Scholarly debate over what more the clause could stand to mean is, therefore, 
a bit of a distraction.  The clause’s anti-aristocracy meaning is, and always 
has been, up to the task the nation needs it for. 
II.  THE ARISTOCRATIC EXPERIMENTS OF SEVERAL STATES 
Scholars wrongly assume that the threat of aristocratic encroachment that 
prompted the drafting of the Guarantee Clause became largely anachronistic 
soon after the founding.127  This was not true by Reconstruction and it is not 
true today.  Aristocratic innovations are again clogging up the machineries 
of representative democracy in many states.  The problems of political 
entrenchment and the anticompetitive lockup of the political markets by 
incumbent powers, voter suppression, and the corruptive influence of money 
in politics are well known.128  Yet, there is little serious acknowledgment that 
the laws and policies undergirding these political failures should be viewed 
as aristocratic and thus, as flouting republican government under the 
Guarantee Clause.  Conversely, scholars of the Guarantee Clause do not 
 
 126. Though, one might argue that due process is fundamental to equal citizenship and that 
transparency and the separation of powers are indispensable to popular sovereignty, lest the 
people lack the knowledge and diverse levers of influence necessary to maintain effective 
control over their rulers.  Indeed, litigants opposing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court’s 2003 decision protecting the right to same-sex marriage under the Massachusetts state 
constitution asked the federal courts to enjoin the decision under the Guarantee Clause, 
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Jud. Ct., 373 F.3d 219, 229 (1st. Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 801, 1002 (2004). 
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 128. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 27, at 505–06; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 26, at 
648–49; Michael Klarman, The Supreme Court, 2019 Term—Foreword:  The Degradation of 
American Democracy—and the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9–10, 46, 195, 207 (2020). 
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evaluate these widespread political practices as suppressing representative 
government in a way that runs afoul of states’ obligation to maintain 
republican forms of government.129  Understanding this connection is not 
simply a labor of constitutional excavation.130  It is a process of translation 
and adaptation of the kind the founders anticipated and the Guarantee Clause 
requires.  The Reconstruction Congress adapted the clause to address 
extraordinary problems of republican rot that the Framers did not foresee and 
at times, blindly ignored.  The Guarantee Clause is now called on to do this 
work of republican reconstruction again. 
Two contemporary political devices that violate both core principles of 
popular sovereignty and equal citizenship are worth examining as 
particularly egregious yet widely employed examples of the type of 
aristocratic encroachments the Guarantee Clause was designed to prevent.  
The first is partisan gerrymandering, which subverts the core tenet of popular 
sovereignty that the ruled choose their rulers, and devalues the political 
participation of some citizens while elevating that of others.  The second is 
criminal disenfranchisement, which in some states excludes a significant 
percentage of the adult population from full and equal participation in self-
government.131  Both of these practices deny sovereignty to the full polis and 
privilege an elite class with outsize political influence over the composition 
and decisions of government.132  And as will be discussed as to each, it 
 
 129. Two scholars have recognized the connection between the Guarantee Clause and the 
problem of malapportionment but focus on critiquing the Supreme Court’s missed opportunity 
to address this practice under the Guarantee Clause as opposed to under an individual rights 
framework. McConnell, supra note 10, at 114–15; Ari J. Savitzky, Note, The Law of 
Democracy and the Two Luther v. Bordens:  A Counterhistory, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2028, 2057–
58 (2011).  Jarret Zafran expanded on this analysis by demonstrating the Guarantee Clause’s 
salience for addressing entrenchment but again, only focused on the clause as a vehicle for 
judicial intervention. See Zafran, supra note 29, at 1454. 
 130. See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1539 (recognizing the task for modern republicans “is 
not simply one of excavation” and that “[h]istory does not supply conceptions of political life 
that can be applied mechanically to current problems . . . contemporary social and legal issues 
can never be resolved merely through recovery of features, however important and attractive, 
of the distant past”). 
 131. A third category of aristocratic political devices that may well also violate the 
principles of republican government are practices that permit the audacious influence of 
money in politics, both at the campaign and lobbying levels.  These devices, at their extremes, 
sever the representative and dependent relationship between the governed and the governors 
in ways that grant the wealthy a greater share of political power.  A full explanation of the 
specific aspects of states’ current campaign finance, ethics, and lobbying regimes that run 
afoul of republican government is outside of the scope of this Article; suffice it to say here 
that they may likewise prove to be modern manifestations of aristocratic devices Congress 
may act against under the Guarantee Clause. 
 132. Professor Deborah Merritt’s argument that the Guarantee Clause protects republican 
states against just such kinds of federal encroachment into state political process rights is 
unavailing. See Merritt, supra note 29, at 25, 36.  Merritt argues that the power to define the 
franchise is an exclusively state prerogative.  Yet, she concedes that where a state has become 
unrepublican, the clause is no barrier to federal intrusion into what she claims are traditional 
areas of state autonomy.  Indeed, Merritt admits that certain voting qualifications would render 
a state’s practices “[in]consistent with republican principles.” Id. at 38.  However, she cabins 
such voting qualifications to those that the Constitution outlaws under the Fourteenth, 
Fifteenth, Nineteen, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments.  Outside of these limits, 
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matters not under the Guarantee Clause whether the Constitution otherwise 
prohibits or permits such practices.  Neither constitutional silence nor 
acquiescence to a political practice permanently imprints that practice with 
republican legitimacy.  As specific parts of the Constitution grow 
incompatible with evolving standards of republican government, the general 
command to ensure states retain a republican government may supersede the 
document’s outdated omissions or endorsements. 
A.  Entrenchment Through Partisan Gerrymandering 
Essential to any republic of size is a system of representation, whereby 
governing authority is delegated to legislators who remain accountable to the 
political will of the sovereign people.  Accountability is accomplished 
through frequent and fair elections to ensure representatives retain “an 
immediate dependence on, & an intimate sympathy with the people.”133  In 
the words of John Adams, a republican legislature “should be an equal 
representation, or, in other words, equal interests among the people should 
have equal interests in it.  Great care should be taken to effect this, and to 
prevent unfair, partial, and corrupt elections.”134  Indispensable to this goal 
 
she does not see how other voting restrictions might be inconsistent with popular 
representation and intimates that all other restrictions on voting are within a “reservoir of state 
power” that could only render a state unrepublican if subsequently outlawed by a 
constitutional amendment. Id. at 40.  She employs the same analysis for the authority to 
organize the structure and mechanics of state government, acknowledging that states cannot 
make certain internal governmental process choices that violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments but claims states are otherwise free from “the federal government’s power to 
interfere with the organizational structure and governmental process chosen by a state’s 
residents.” Id. at 41.  She notes in particular that felon disenfranchisement is within a state’s 
power to effect, as are drawing state election districts and other election procedures. Id. at 39, 
41.  Her analysis errs in at least three ways.  First, a voting qualification or election procedure 
can render a state unrepublican without constituting a separate constitutional violation because 
it is the suppression of popular representation that makes a voting restriction unrepublican, 
not its defiance of the rule of law.  Indeed, there are myriad unrepublican innovations a state 
could enact that do not violate an express constitutional provision or federal law, most 
especially restrictions that have a disparate political or socioeconomic impact on minority 
voters.  Currently, voter roll purges, the closing of polling sites, and voter registration barriers 
all have an unrepublican impact but are not strictly unconstitutional.  The second problem with 
her analysis is that it incorrectly interprets the clause as a static right, incapable of responding 
to aristocratic “innovations” in the states.  Yet, as discussed at length above, all textual and 
historical evidence, as well as Supreme Court precedent, belies this interpretation of the 
clause.  Finally, Merritt does not properly contend with the sovereignty denominator problem 
in a federalist society.  The American public, as well as the federal government, has a national 
sovereign interest in ensuring that each state comports with republican government.  While 
federal intervention does sometimes override state popular sovereignty, it does so under the 
authority of a higher sovereign mandate. 
 133. THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 48, at 256 (James Madison). 
 134. ADAMS, supra note 104, at 195.  The Constitution took pains to forestall entrenchment.  
Short terms, fixed elections, the inability to tinker with membership qualifications, and a 
required decennial census were all included precisely to keep those in power dependent on the 
will of the people.  Regular and fixed elections and enumerations were designed to essentially 
constitutionalize popular representation. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 68, 84; 3 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 51, at 369 (statement of Patrick Henry); THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra 
note 48 (James Madison). 
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is officeholders’ dependence on “the great body of the society, not [on] an 
inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it.”135 
Partisan gerrymandering is government by a favored class.  It is the 
legislative practice of drawing electoral districts to discount the votes of some 
citizens and to favor the votes of others to ensure the election of an incumbent 
party member regardless of popular will.  It works by “packing,” “cracking,” 
or otherwise assigning citizens to districts in ways designed to minimize the 
political efficacy of certain voters’ political participation, ensuring that the 
legislature’s preferred candidate will prevail.  Sophisticated computer 
software has made the tactic cuttingly precise and highly successful,136 
helping to create an “incumbent retention rate that rivals the Soviet Union’s 
at its height.”137  By facilitating this level of entrenchment, partisan 
gerrymandering subverts the dependence relationship between ruler and 
ruled.  It enables legislators to shape their own districts to ensure their own 
reelections to power.  In short, it corrupts the fundamental principle of 
republican government that the people choose their representatives and not 
the other way around. 
Contemporary partisan gerrymandering does more than corrupt the 
dependence relationship between voters and their representatives, though; its 
accuracy is so sophisticated it now threatens the foundational principle of 
majority rule.  Gerrymanders are most subversive in battleground states, 
where democracy ought to be at its zenith as a result of robustly contested 
elections.  It is in these states, like Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, that partisan gerrymandering is causing 
extreme misrepresentation, to the point of installing minority rule.  In the 
2018 election cycle, it is estimated that seven state legislative chambers that 
should have flipped party control based on voter preference did not do so as 
a result of partisan gerrymandering.138  In at least Michigan, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, state Democratic candidates won a clear 
majority of the statewide popular vote but a minority of the state’s legislative 
seats.139 
 
 135. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 48, at 182 (James Madison). 
 136. Michael Wines, Just How Bad Is Partisan Gerrymandering?:  Ask the Mapmakers, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/29/us/gerrymander-political-
maps-maryland.html [https://perma.cc/ST5M-YZ95]. 
 137. Pamela S. Karlan, A Bigger Picture, in REFLECTING ALL OF US:  THE CASE FOR 
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 73, 73 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999); see also 
Election Trends, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/elections-overview/ 
election-trends [https://perma.cc/A38Q-JYXP] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). 
 138. David A. Lieb, GOP Won More Seats in 2018 than Suggested by Vote Share, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 21, 2019), https://apnews.com/ 
9fd72a4c1c5742aead977ee27815d776 [https://perma.cc/FA8Y-BZYZ]. 
 139. Christopher Ingraham, In at Least Three States, Republicans Lost the Popular Vote 
but Won the House, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/business/2018/11/13/least-three-states-republicans-lost-popular-vote-won-house/ 
[https://perma.cc/3G8G-RSEA].  Particularly egregious was Wisconsin’s election, in which 
Democrats won 53 percent of the popular vote but only 36 percent of the state assembly’s 
legislative seats. See Angeliki Kastanis et al., Moving the Flip Zone:  Democrats March 
Deeper into Suburbia, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 6, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election-
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Just as problematic as partisan gerrymandering’s self-entrenchment aspect 
is its disparate racial impact.  There is a very strong relationship between race 
discrimination in voting and partisan gerrymandering, particularly in the 
South.  Racial minorities overwhelmingly support one of the two major 
political parties:  84 percent of Black Americans align with the Democratic 
Party, while just 8 percent identify in some way with the Republican Party.140  
Partisan disenfranchisement thus in reality amounts to a proxy for racial 
disenfranchisement.  It is no wonder that partisan gerrymandering increased 
precisely when malapportionment subsided, which had served to dilute the 
voting power of Black Americans concentrated in cities.141  By drawing 
districts to weaken the political ability of Black Americans to elect their 
chosen representatives, partisan gerrymandering works an especially 
insidious aristocratic encroachment in the tradition of slave aristocracies. 
State partisan gerrymandering then quickly translates into 
unrepresentativeness at the federal level.  In North Carolina and 
Pennsylvania, Democratic congressional candidates won a majority of the 
popular vote but only a quarter of the state’s congressional seats because of 
partisan gerrymandering.142  Across the country, partisan gerrymandering 
tactics ensured that Republicans won sixteen more seats in the U.S. House of 
Representatives in 2018 than they otherwise should have.143  More than 
twenty bills introduced in that congressional term, addressing security, 
defense, climate change, immigration, voting rights, and economic policies, 
failed by fewer than twenty votes in the House.144 
This self-dealing entrenchment transforms republican government into a 
modern form of aristocracy.145  It flouts the core republican principles that 




 140. PEW RSCH. CTR., WIDE GENDER GAP, GROWING EDUCATIONAL DIVIDE IN VOTERS’ 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 2 (2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/03/20/wide-
gender-gap-growing-educational-divide-in-voters-party-identification/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5FZT-85H9]. 
 141. See Lani Guinier & Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Difficulty:  One Person, One 
Vote, in REASON AND PASSION:  JUSTICE BRENNAN’S ENDURING INFLUENCE 207, 219 (E. Joshua 
Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997). 
 142. In North Carolina, Democrats won almost exactly half of the votes cast but only three 
of the thirteen (23 percent) state congressional districts. See Thomas Wolf & Peter Miller, 
How Gerrymandering Kept Democrats from Winning Even More Seats Tuesday, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11/08/how-gerrymandering-
kept-democrats-winning-even-more-seats-tuesday/ [https://perma.cc/8K6E-H57W].  In 
Pennsylvania, Democrats won 51 percent of the statewide congressional vote but only secured 
five out of eighteen (28 percent) congressional seats. See Christopher Ingraham, How 
Pennsylvania Republicans Pulled off Their Aggressive Gerrymander, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/02/06/how-pennsylvania-
republicans-pulled-off-their-aggressive-gerrymander/ [https://perma.cc/KH8S-UG45]. 
 143. See Lieb, supra note 138. 
 144. See Voting Records, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
votes#session=303&chamber[]=2&passed[]=false [https://perma.cc/SU8J-NTHU] (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2021) (displaying voting records of failed House bills in the 116th Congress). 
 145. AMAR, supra note 55, at 68. 
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entitled to an equal say in who represents them.146  In place of these 
principles, gerrymandering substitutes the aristocratic model, in which power 
resides in an entrenched class of elite citizens who exercise an outsize share 
of political authority to determine the composition of government.  Though 
partisan gerrymandering does not ensure hereditary entrenchment of power, 
heredity is not a necessary feature of aristocratic rule.  Heredity is simply a 
dated mechanism of entrenchment.  Like partisan gerrymandering, it destroys 
the representative relationship between the rulers and the ruled, just as it also 
elevates the governing authority of one class of citizens over another.  By 
replacing lineage with data analytics, partisan gerrymandering accomplishes 
the same aristocratic goal of perpetually entrenching power in one group, 
independent of popular will. 
That political gerrymandering is fundamentally unrepublican is not a novel 
criticism.  As with racial and gender inequality in voting, there is a prolific 
history of its disapproval as contrary to republican government from the 
outset.  The first partisan gerrymander, occurring in Virginia in 1788, was 
immediately condemned as unrepublican for being “a violation of the right 
of a free people to choose their representatives.”147  The term “gerrymander” 
entered the national lexicon a quarter century later when Massachusetts 
governor Elbridge Gerry approved an outrageous map that resembled a 
salamander.148  The map was emphatically criticized not only as 
unconstitutional but also because “it in fact subverts and changes our Form 
of Government.”149  Popular condemnation of partisan gerrymandering has 
consistently taken the position that it deprives the people of their sovereign 
function in a republic.150  A milestone democracy reform bill currently 
pending in Congress takes aim at partisan gerrymandering as antithetical to 
democracy and finds its elimination necessary “to fulfill the promise of 
article IV, section 4.”151 
So it was that one of the first times the Guarantee Clause bubbled into the 
national political conversation was in response to an uprising that stemmed 
from popular discontent with severe disenfranchisement and 
malapportionment.  The 1841 Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island saw dueling 
political factions convene two competing state constitutional conventions to 
 
 146. Id. at 68, 84. 
 147. ELMER C. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER 41 (1907); 
see also Thomas Rogers Hunter, The First Gerrymander?:  Patrick Henry, James Madison, 
James Monroe, and Virginia’s 1788 Congressional Districting, 9 EARLY AM. STUD. 781, 785 
(2011). 
 148. GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S SALAMANDER:  THE 
ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 3 (2004); Hunter, supra 
note 147, at 807. 
 149. The Gerry-Mander, or Essex South District Formed into a Monster!, SALEM GAZETTE, 
Apr. 2, 1813, https://digital.library.cornell.edu/catalog/ss:3293783 [https://perma.cc/KAE9-
NSMV]. 
 150. See Brief of Amici Curiae Historians in Support of Appellees at 3–4, Gill v. Whitford, 
138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL 4311107, at *3–4; GRIFFITH, supra note 147, 
at 106–07. 
 151. See For The People Act of 2021, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 3 (2021). 
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address the unequal political power between country and city folk as a result 
of extremely malapportioned state voting districts.152  The two factions 
ultimately established alternative governments and each appealed to the 
federal government for recognition and assistance under the Guarantee 
Clause.153  While all three branches of the federal government successfully 
sidestepped intervening in that political dispute, the relationship between the 
Guarantee Clause and the problem of gerrymandering was forged, only to 
become stronger ever since.154 
As was made clear during Reconstruction, it matters not whether the 
Constitution otherwise prohibits partisan gerrymandering or that the practice 
has a long history of use for it to be deemed unrepublican under the 
Guarantee Clause.  Neither long-standing practice nor constitutional 
acquiescence to a practice endows it with permanent republican bona fides.  
The Constitution did not prohibit racial discrimination or the alienation of 
slaves—indeed it explicitly endorsed the political subjugation of slaves.  The 
practice of disenfranchising and legally discriminating against Blacks, both 
slave and free, was ubiquitous throughout the United States, from the 
founding, through the Civil War, and thereafter.  Yet, such unequal treatment 
on the basis of race came to be accepted as antithetical to republican 
government and a legitimate target of federal abolition under the Guarantee 
Clause.  The continued disenfranchisement and discrimination against Black 
Americans into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries certainly calls into 
question our national commitment to republicanism, but it does not erase the 
acceptance of a new democratic norm that unequal treatment on the basis of 
race is unrepublican.  The same applies to partisan gerrymandering and any 
other electoral or political practice that has a deep, if altogether shameful, 
history.  Neither its historical use, dubious constitutional approval, nor 
continued embrace are dispositive for whether, by contemporary standards, 
partisan gerrymandering violates the principles of popular sovereignty and 
equal citizenship.  It clearly does. 
B.  Criminal Disenfranchisement 
The denial of the right to vote is more than an individual rights violation, 
it is an infringement on the republican character of a state.  Depleting the 
pool of citizens rightfully entitled to partake in the franchise leaves 
government without the full consent of the governed.  The right of suffrage 
“is fundamental to republics,” and “consequently secured, because the . . . 
constitution, guarantees to every state in the union, a republican form of 
government.”155  Where a state disenfranchises a significant number of its 
 
 152. See WIECEK, supra note 29, at 91–95. 
 153. See id. 
 154. The Court considered challenges to malapportionment under the Guarantee Clause but 
ultimately held any reliance on that clause was “futile,” opting instead to rest its decision on 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (for state districts) and Article I, 
Section 2 (for congressional districts). Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Wesberry 
v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226–27 (1962). 
 155. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 51, at 448 (statement of James Wilson). 
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citizens, thus denying them equal sovereignty, it devolves into an aristocratic 
form of government that does not rest on the consent of the people but on the 
approval of a favored class. 
The Reconstruction Republicans understood this basic rule of 
republicanism.  When the ex-Confederate states adopted new state 
constitutions that continued to disfranchise the now free Black male citizens 
of their states, Republicans declared such levels of disenfranchisement to 
“violat[e] a distinctive principle of republican government.”156  These states 
were, collectively, denying the vote to nearly four million newly freed slaves, 
or 12.6 percent of the national population.157  It can be estimated that between 
a quarter and half were males of voting age.158  As a percentage of state 
population, all of the ex-rebel states were disenfranchising between 10 to 30 
percent of their adult male populations on account of race.159  It was only 
with the First Reconstruction Act of 1867 that some 703,000 Black 
Americans registered to exercise their right to vote in the South.160  In five 
states—Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina—
Black voters became the majority of the registered voting population.161 
Today, criminal disenfranchisement produces modern versions of these 
levels of illegitimate disenfranchisement.  Five and a quarter million citizens 
of voting age are denied the right to vote because of a conviction.162  Put in 
context, a state of this size would be the twenty-fourth most populous state, 
entitled to seven seats in the House of Representatives and nine votes in the 
Electoral College.  Approximately 1.3 million are disenfranchised prisoners 
currently serving sentences,163 possibly for nonfelony offenses, and nearly 
3.9 million are not incarcerated and living in our communities.164  Thirty-one 
states deny the right to vote to released individuals with certain felony 
 
 156. Senator Charles Sumner, Speech in the Senate on the Proposed Amendment of the 
Constitution Fixing the Basis of Representation (Feb. 5–6, 1866), in 10 THE WORKS OF 
CHARLES SUMNER, supra note 102, at 118, 207.  While the Northern states also disenfranchised 
their adult Black male citizens, Congress determined, with varying degrees of embitterment, 
that this was consistent with republican government because that level of disenfranchisement 
was “on so small a scale that it is not perilous to the Republic.” Id. at 135. 
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GJ96] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). 
 160. COLEMAN, supra note 80, at 4. 
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546 (1979). 
 162. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 4. 
 163. See Emmett Sanders, Full Human Beings:  An Argument for Incarcerated Voter 
Enfranchisement, PEOPLE’S POL’Y PROJECT, https://www.peoplespolicyproject.org/ 
projects/prisoner-voting/ [https://perma.cc/K55N-BJPT] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021). 
 164. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 16. 
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convictions who are on parole or probation.165  Thirteen of these states 
restrict some or all felons’ right to vote even after they are no longer on parole 
or probation.166  Twelve states impose some form of permanent felon 
disenfranchisement.167  In all, an estimated 2.3 million people are 
disenfranchised under state laws that restrict voting rights after completion 
of sentences.168 
These levels of disenfranchisement mostly hail from ten states, which 
together deny over three quarters of these 5.2 million individuals the right to 
vote.169  In six of these states—Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, 
Tennessee, and Virginia—between 6 and 11 percent of the state’s total adult 
population is disenfranchised due to prisoner or felon status.170  This is 
comparable to the levels of Black male disenfranchisement in several of the 
ex-Confederate states deemed unrepublican and subject to the Guarantee 
Clause in 1865. 
The comparison is made all the more poignant when viewed through a 
racial lens.  In five states, more than one in six Black Americans is 
disenfranchised, and in another four states, more than 10 percent of the state’s 
total Black population is denied the right to vote.171  In Tennessee and 
Wyoming respectively, over one fifth and one third of adult Black Americans 
cannot vote.172  To compound this racial disparity in voting power, prisoners 
are almost always counted in the populations of the locations where they are 
incarcerated, as opposed to their communities of origin.173  This discrepancy 
has the effect of transferring congressional power away from Black 
communities into predominantly white, rural communities where prisons are 
located.174  The counting of Black prisoners toward the apportionment of 
representatives for their predominately white overseers, while 
simultaneously denying these prisoners the right to vote, is nothing less than 
 
 165. Id. at 5–6. 
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a modern manifestation of the Three-Fifths Clause—which time, war, and 
constitutional progress have relegated to the graveyard of grossly 
unrepublican political practices. 
These statistics lay bare an intolerable abandonment of republican 
principles.  Disenfranchisement based on conviction unequally excludes a 
significant number of citizens from the sovereign public on an illegitimate 
basis.  The principal reason put forward for denying equal citizenship to those 
convicted of a crime is that criminality reflects a lack of civic virtue—an 
inability to contribute responsibly to the common task of self-government.  
But the commission of a crime is as ill founded an indicator of civic virtue as 
race, religion, sex, or gender.  There is no evidence that criminality is 
correlated with intelligence or virtue.  Moreover, criminal law and its 
enforcement reflect a series of policy decisions to prioritize the 
criminalization and punishment of particular activities that often have little 
or no bearing on one’s fitness to participate in the political process.  Worse 
yet, those policy decisions disparately impact communities on the basis of 
intrinsic characteristics—including race, ethnicity, sexuality, and 
disability—as well as socioeconomic status, which itself is largely a product 
of other policy decisions that negatively impact these demographics.175 
Another defense offered for criminal disenfranchisement is that it is a just 
punishment.  But the argument that the state may penalize citizens by 
depriving them of their sovereignty is untenable.  While the choice to break 
a law can certainly reflect poor judgment, it is outside the power of a 
republican state, whose authority is delegated to it by the sovereign people, 
to deprive any of the citizens it answers to of their sovereignty based on their 
choices or judgments.  To illustrate the point, a boss who delegates interim 
authority to a subordinate to govern a meeting does not, indeed cannot, 
delegate to the subordinate the power to fire the boss—the boss retains her 
position and ultimate authority over the subordinate, whether or not she 
submits to following any ground rules the subordinate lays out in the course 
of managing the meeting.  So too in a republic—the state is ever dependent 
on and subordinate to the people; even as it exercises legal authority over 
them, it cannot tamper with their sovereign authority over the state so long 
as they remain capable citizens. 
Finally, criminal disenfranchisement is often defended on the basis that it 
is implicitly authorized under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Section 2 reduces a state’s representation in Congress proportionately to the 
number of adult male citizens the state disenfranchises, with the exception of 
any such citizens disenfranchised for “participation in rebellion, or other 
crime.”176  The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as affirmatively 
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sanctioning criminal disenfranchisement.177  Regardless of the soundness of 
this interpretation, constitutional endorsement of a practice is not 
permanently conclusive as to that practice’s republican character.  Like 
partisan gerrymandering, criminal disenfranchisement violates the principles 
of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship by its nature, but its 
incompatibility with republicanism grew all the more extreme as the practice 
exploded and it became highly racialized.  Thus, where provisions of the 
Constitution may be democratically legitimate, as reflective of the majority 
will of the people, their ratification does not permanently imbue these 
provisions with republican legitimacy.  One may presume that a majority of 
the people’s representatives ratify amendments in compliance with 
contemporary standards of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship; but as 
those standards evolve, the Guarantee Clause permits a current Congress to 
address outmoded practices that no longer comport with republican 
government, whether sanctioned by law, historical practice, or constitutional 
endorsement. 
Current members of Congress have recognized that criminal 
disenfranchisement is unrepublican but have failed to follow the 
constitutional trail blazed by their predecessors under the Guarantee Clause.  
Their bill, the For the People Act,178 would only protect the right of 
individuals with criminal convictions to vote in federal elections and would 
not extend the franchise to individuals currently serving felony sentences.179  
The narrowness of this intervention and its failure to address criminal 
disenfranchisement in state elections misses the mark.  The same 
shortcoming applies to the pending bill’s sections on redistricting reform.180  
The bill would only eliminate partisan gerrymandering in the drawing of 
congressional districts.  These practices at the state level are as unrepublican 
as they are at the federal level and greatly impact the democratic integrity of 
the federal government.  Congress ought to legislate against them at the state 
level too. 
The newest version of the For the People Act does purport to rely on 
Congress’s “authority and responsibility to enforce the Guarantee Clause,”181 
whereas the original version of the bill only relied on Congress’s power to 
set the manner of elections under Article I, Section 4 and its power to enforce 
the Eighth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth 
Amendments.182  This addition is a welcome sign that Congress understands 
these problems are not simply individual rights issues.  It is not just the 
individual who suffers and requires recourse when her political equality is 
undermined.  It is the entire community and, indeed, the people at large.  As 
Justice John Marshall Harlan understood in his dissent in Plessy v. 
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Ferguson,183 denying civil rights to citizens “constituting a part of the 
political community, called the ‘People of the United States,’ for whom, and 
by whom through representatives, our government is administered . . . is 
inconsistent with the guaranty given by the constitution to each state of a 
republican form of government.”184  Having recognized the underlying harm 
to republican government that criminal disenfranchisement and partisan 
gerrymandering inflict, Congress ought now to use its guarantee power in 
earnest to ban these practices at the state level. 
III.  ENFORCING THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE AGAINST ARISTOCRATIC 
STATES 
That the Guarantee Clause’s salience is not lost to history raises the 
question:  how should it be used?  Unlike other powers the Constitution 
delegates to the federal government, the question of enforcement under the 
Guarantee Clause is quite unclear.  The clause obscures which federal actor 
is the first mover by placing the obligation in Article IV and designating the 
entire United States as guarantor.185  Furthermore, the clause is oddly silent 
as to its precise enforcement mechanism, making no mention of “appropriate 
legislation,”186 “calling forth the Militia,”187 laying taxes,188 judicial 
enforcement,189 or any other mode of exercising government authority.190  
This omission is in stark contrast to the fairly precise detail the Constitution 
supplies for exercising most other powers delegated to the federal 
government—such as providing specifics for how to populate the federal 
bureaucracy, how to impeach a president, how to ratify an amendment, and 
how to join two states.191 
Yet, this unanswered, extremely consequential question continues to be 
overlooked.  The reason, presumably, is that scholars have declared the 
clause a constitutional nullity.192  Such disregard stems not only from a 
misunderstanding of the clause’s current salience but also from an overactive 
focus on judicial enforcement of constitutional rights.  In the wake of a nearly 
two-hundred-year line of unbroken precedent declaring the Guarantee Clause 
nonjusticiable, nearly all scholarly discussion of the clause has nonetheless 
fixated on dissecting, debating, and disagreeing with this decision.193  
Avenues for enforcing constitutional rights do not start and end at the 
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courthouse steps.  Indeed, the Supreme Court is often the least likely and 
least capable enforcer of many constitutional rights.194 
Few scholars have offered ideas for congressional enforcement of the 
Guarantee Clause, and none has fleshed out the mechanisms of congressional 
enforcement beyond proposing that Congress pass a specific law addressing 
unrepublican activity.  Adam Kurland, for example, proposes Congress pass 
a state anticorruption law pursuant to the Guarantee Clause,195 and Professor 
Mark Alexander argues that the Guarantee Clause enables Congress to pass 
campaign finance legislation that satisfies First Amendment scrutiny.196  But 
both limit their proposals to passing new legislation, contemplating no more 
than Congress’s standard legislative prerogative to impose direct legal 
obligations on individuals.197 
Substantive legislation that acts on individuals is but one way to rectify 
unrepublican activity in the states, but it is not the only way.  The Guarantee 
Clause endows Congress with three distinct mechanisms for enforcing the 
guarantee:  it may legislate directly under the Guarantee Clause against 
individuals and state governments to prohibit unrepublican state practices; it 
may use its ancillary Article I powers to incentivize states to adopt needed 
republican reforms; and, in cases of necessity, it may dissolve a state 
government and convene a state constitutional convention. 
Textual, purposivist, and historical analyses of the clause all support this 
interpretation.  Importantly, this reading recognizes that the “clause was 
powerfully and publicly glossed” by its use in the aftermath of the Civil War 
to carry Reconstruction into effect and by the repeated endorsement of this 
use of the clause by the American people in a series of watershed elections 
during Reconstruction.198 
What little the Supreme Court has said about the scope and substance of 
Congress’s guarantee power also supports a broad and dynamic 
understanding of this authority.  The Court’s early opinions on the separation 
of powers squarely place responsibility for effectuating the Constitution’s 
general powers in Congress and embrace the notion of wide legislative 
discretion to adopt “new changes and modifications of power [that] might be 
indispensable to effectuate the general objects of the charter.”199  Where 
details are scant and power is expressed in general terms, the Constitution 
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“leav[es] to the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own means to 
effectuate legitimate objects, and to mould and model the exercise of its 
powers, as its own wisdom, and the public interests, should require.”200 
The Court reiterated this model of congressional primacy and latitude in 
its first major exposition of the Guarantee Clause, declaring that, “[u]nder 
this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide what 
government is the established one in a State,” to “determine whether it is 
republican or not,” and “the means proper to be adopted to fulfil this 
guarantee.”201  The Court has not waivered on this holding.  Even in the midst 
of Reconstruction, an unsympathetic, conservative Supreme Court ultimately 
sanctioned Congress’s use of the Guarantee Clause to impose military rule 
and direct the formation of new state governments, acknowledging that “a 
discretion in the choice of means is necessarily allowed” for Congress to 
restore “the State to its constitutional relations, under a republican form of 
government.”202  Even as the Court subsequently dismantled the advances of 
Reconstruction piece by piece,203 it never renounced its endorsement of the 
Guarantee Clause as empowering Congress to use all means necessary and 
proper to intervene in the political affairs of the states.204 
The Framers of the Guarantee Clause understood that the American 
experiment with republicanism was fragile—that internal and external threats 
to the system abounded.  They meant to give the federal government a 
powerful and adaptive tool to protect the nascent and tenuous national project 
they had launched.205  This tool was designed to address the immediate 
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known threats of monarchical usurpation and aristocratic encroachments and 
to provide a sufficiently nimble and broad grant of authority to confront the 
unforeseeable manifestations of this threat in the future. 
The threat did indeed metastasize in other forms, including through the 
institution of slavery and various subsequent manifestations of 
disempowerment, discrimination, and disenfranchisement.  Yet, the 
constitutionally available mechanisms for excising these political practices 
via the guarantee power have lain dormant.  Understanding this power 
through a textual, purposivist, and historical lens excavates at least three 
means of enforcement:  federal legislation, federal incentives, and state 
reconstruction.  Only by moving beyond what the clause guarantees to how 
it guarantees it will the political potential of the Guarantee Clause 
reawaken.206 
A.  Legislating Against Unrepublican State Practices 
The Guarantee Clause is an independent source of legislative power to 
restructure state governments in conformity with republican principles.  This 
legislative function of the clause supplements Congress’s other legislative 
powers in a distinct way, even as it complements Congress’s auxiliary 
authorities to protect due process, equal protection, and constitutional 
franchise requirements.  It was an entirely unique grant of authority under the 
1788 Constitution, and it was then reinforced by new provisions expanding 
Congress’s legislative enforcement powers under the voting rights and 
Reconstruction Amendments.  The guarantee power remains, however, the 
only general federal authority to intervene directly in the states’ republican 
relations with its people, not limited to specific prohibitions like poll taxes or 
to practices that are racially discriminatory or that affect interstate commerce. 
The clause makes clear that one vehicle for exercising this general grant 
of power is through congressional legislation.  The Constitution attaches the 
guarantee obligation to “The United States.”  The Necessary and Proper 
Clause of Article I grants Congress the authority to “make all laws” necessary 
for carrying into execution the powers the Constitution vests in “the United 
States.”207  In addition, the Constitution uses the term “United States” when 
referring to the federal government as a sovereign whole, comprised of three 
branches, each exercising a separate core governing function.208  A general 
grant of authority to “the United States,” therefore, is a grant to each branch 
to exercise its constitutionally assigned function in enforcing that provision.  
Under the Guarantee Clause, it is for Congress to legislate against 
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unrepublican practices, the executive to enforce that legislation, and the 
judiciary to adjudicate any resulting disputes. 
The clause’s verbiage is similarly instructive.  It obligates the federal 
government to “guarantee” a republican form of government to every state, 
conferring one of the only positive rights in the original Constitution.  As 
discussed, this affirmative obligation necessarily implies the authority to 
employ both preventive and corrective measures.209  It similarly permits 
interventions short of using military force.  The primary constitutional 
method for enacting preventative, peaceful measures is congressional 
legislation. 
Even the placement of the Guarantee Clause in Article IV points to its 
fount as a source of legislative authority.  Article IV consists of seven clauses 
on states’ relations and obligations, including several grants of lawmaking 
authority to Congress to enforce these obligations.  At the same time, it is not 
where the Constitution places its negative restraints on states’ authority.  
Those are listed in Article I, Section 10.  The placement of the Guarantee 
Clause in Article IV, therefore, emphasizes its role as a positive grant of 
lawmaking authority as opposed to a negative restraint on states’ authority. 
The enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments shed further 
light on the proper interpretation of the Guarantee Clause’s legislative 
function.  Each of the Reconstruction Amendments includes a provision 
explicitly empowering Congress to enforce the rights established by that 
amendment through appropriate legislation.  Congress drafted these 
enforcement clauses as it was passing legislation to impose the very legal 
transformations it intended to make permanent through the Reconstruction 
Amendments.  In so doing, Congress likely modeled the enforcement 
provisions it drafted on the enforcement authority it was currently exercising 
to preserve for itself the authority to protect and advance the rights won under 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.210 
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Finally, the Guarantee Clause’s lawmaking power is confirmed by the 
surplusage canon.  The guarantee power is not redundant of Congress’s other 
legislative reserves and should not be interpreted as such.  It does enjoy some 
overlap, as many constitutional provisions do.211  But even setting aside that 
the clause would have filled a major gap in Congress’s legislative power at 
the founding, before there were any amendments guaranteeing the rights of 
republican citizens and when the Commerce Clause had only a fragment of 
its current stature, the guarantee power still retains a distinct legislative 
function today. 
First, the clause permits tailored legislation against specific states that the 
principle of equal state sovereignty otherwise makes difficult under other 
legislative authorities.212  The clause applies to “every State,” in the singular, 
not to all the states as a group.213  It was conceived amidst concerns over 
turmoil in specific states,214 and it was drafted and has only ever been used 
to intervene in individual states where republican government has broken 
down.215  Moreover, it explicitly displaces background principles of 
federalism by speaking directly to the proper constitutional balance between 
federal power and state sovereignty under the clause—in instances of 
domestic violence, the state must approve the federal interference,216 and in 
cases of invasion or breakdown of republican government, the federal 
government is obligated to intervene, with no prior consent of the state 
required.217 
Substantively, the guarantee power may be the exclusive vehicle for 
imposing a host of necessary republican reforms.  For example, it is likely 
the only means of redressing non-voting-related state political practices that 
corrode the dependency relationship between representatives and the people.  
Such practices include corrupt lobbying, special access, and campaign 
finance practices that trade influence, access, money, and favors for power.  
It would also reach state actions that have an outsize effect on the ability of 
the poor to participate in self-government, including the closure of polling 
sites, voter roll purges, the absence of early voting procedures, and holding 
elections on weekdays.  Indeed, it is the apex of aristocracy to have to pay to 
vote because one is forced to choose whether to go to work or to the polls. 
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Furthermore, the guarantee power could further singularly reach 
unrepublican state practices that are not explicitly racially discriminatory, 
such as the failure to provide adequate state services.218  It is also the only 
constitutional means of abrogating state sovereign immunity for 
unrepublican practices that fall outside the protective umbrella of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  It can further be employed against 
unchecked unrepublican practices by private actors that do not substantially 
affect interstate commerce, such as gender-based violence or gun violence, 
on a finding these activities interfere with individuals’ exercise of their full 
political rights as citizens.219  In all these ways, the legislative potential of 
the guarantee power is not superfluous.  But it is also not the only, or even 
the most effective, mechanism for enforcing the guarantee. 
B.  Incentivizing State Political Reform 
Beyond the power to act directly on the states, the Guarantee Clause 
permits Congress to use its other Article I powers to incentivize state 
compliance with republican principles.  Offering incentives instead of 
legislating directly has optical and practical advantages.  Incentives are more 
politically palatable and thus more politically feasible to enact.  They foster 
state buy-in for effectuating large-scale shifts in social and political norms 
and permit Congress to seek legal changes it cannot otherwise 
constitutionally mandate. 
The use of incentives is especially valuable for ushering in more 
permanent republican reforms.  Federal legislation is but one source of law 
for addressing unrepublican practices; three others include state statutes, state 
constitutions, and the U.S. Constitution—the latter two being far more secure 
avenues for implementing lasting republican reforms.  While Congress may 
not legislate a change to these bodies of law, it may use federal incentives to 
spur lasting changes in all three. 
Principles of federalism baked into our constitutional scheme prevent the 
federal government from compelling a state to change its law or 
commandeering state agents, including a state legislature, into implementing 
federal policy.220  But it is uncontroversial that Congress may condition a 
federal incentive on a state adopting a particular legal policy.221  The primary 
limitations on this power are:  (1) that the required condition relate to a 
federal interest and not violate another constitutional provision and (2) that 
the incentive not be unduly coercive or fall outside Congress’s power to 
offer.222  Congress may, consistent with these limitations, fulfill its guarantee 
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obligation by inducing states to pass new law—including constitutional 
law—in exchange for monetary incentives or, in certain circumstances, for 
seating a state’s congressional delegation in Congress. 
1.  Constitutional Conditions:  States Passing Laws and Amendments 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that Congress may seek to 
induce a state to change its law without running afoul of any constitutional 
limitations.223  This is because a state is free to accept or rebuff a federal 
offer.  In other words, the privilege of state sovereignty in a federal system 
sometimes requires the states to act autonomously.  Today, most states have 
ethics, election access, and voting integrity laws pending in their 
legislatures.224  The federal government can, and should, incentivize states’ 
passage of these republican reforms. 
The analysis is the same for a condition requiring a state legislature to 
approve a state or federal constitutional amendment addressing an 
unrepublican practice.  Such state legislative votes are no different than those 
cast to pass a state statute.  Indeed, this type of condition is somewhat less 
intrusive on state sovereignty because these votes have no binding legal 
effect without additional popular approval:  a state legislature’s vote for a 
state constitutional amendment requires approval by popular referendum in 
all but one state before it becomes law,225 and a vote to ratify a federal 
constitutional amendment requires the assent of thirty-seven other states and 
two-thirds of the Congress.226 
A condition for states to pass a constitutional amendment aimed at 
improving governing structures and political process rights complies with 
both limitations on Congress’s conditioning power.  First, it relates to the 
legitimate federal interest in guaranteeing republican government in the 
states.227  Recall that the Reconstruction Congress conditioned readmission 
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having their voting rights restored); H.R. 417, 101st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2021) 
(establishing recusal requirements for the secretary of state and an independent election board 
to supervise elections upon recusal); H.R. 411, 101st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2021) 
(allowing certain incarcerated individuals to vote by absentee ballot); H.R. 377, 101st Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2021) (requiring schools to allow students to leave school 
temporarily to vote); S.J. Res. 272, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2021) (removing restrictions 
on qualifications to vote for convicted felons or individuals adjudicated to be “mentally 
incompetent”); S. 739, 219th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2020) (concerning language accessibility 
requirements on ballots). 
 225. Delaware is the only state that permits its legislature to pass an amendment to its state 
constitution without popular ratification. See DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1. 
 226. U.S. CONST. art V. 
 227. Cf. Merritt, supra note 29, at 70.  Merritt argues that “this ability of Congress to 
override state substantive authority through the supremacy clause—while preserving the 
autonomy of state governmental processes under the guarantee clause—assures a proper 
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of the ex-Confederate states on their ratifying the Fourteenth and, in some 
cases the Fifteenth, Amendment.228  The condition to ratify these 
amendments directly related to the federal interest in reconstructing 
republican government in those states, “precisely because the 
amendment[s] . . . revolved in tight orbit around core principles of republican 
government.”229  Campaigns for state constitutional amendments proposing 
political reforms have been initiated in a number of the states, including 
amendments designed to reform the redistricting process, improve campaign 
finance accountability and transparency, and expand access to voting.230  
Congress may condition an incentive on a state’s passing these state 
constitutional amendments or similar federal constitutional amendments. 
Second, such a ratification condition does not run afoul of any other 
constitutional provision.  It does not induce an unconstitutional act by the 
states, as the Constitution grants state legislatures the authority to ratify an 
amending bill.  It is also a constitutional exercise of congressional power, 
consistent with both Article V and the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The 
Article V amendment process is a political process within Congress’s 
purview to control.231  If it so wishes to spur that process along via its 
ancillary powers, it is within Congress’s political prerogative to do so.  
Indeed, the Constitution twice approves the notion of binding states to 
constitutional reforms without perfect consent.  Article V only requires three-
fourths of the states to ratify an amendment, and Article VII approves binding 
all thirteen original states to a new Constitution upon the consent of only 
nine.232  A “ratification condition” scheme does not come close to imposing 
this level of constitutional coercion on the states.233 
 
balance between national power and state independence.” Id.  Just the opposite balance is 
appropriate.  The federal government is dependent on, and largely comprised of, state actors, 
giving the federal government a significant interest in the integrity of state political processes.  
Additionally, the Constitution is structured to keep most substantive law within the states’ 
prerogatives.  Thus, while the Supremacy Clause does some work in balancing out federal-
state relations, it does not replace the federal government’s distinct self-preservation interest 
in republican state governmental processes.  Indeed, a potentially more efficient way of 
ensuring beneficial state substantive law is to ensure a well-functioning state political process 
that produces law responsive to the people’s interests, rather than to override every detrimental 
state law via the Supremacy Clause. 
 228. See Bonfield, supra note 14, at 540–41; White, supra note 14, at 801. 
 229. AMAR, supra note 55, at 377. 
 230. See, e.g., S. 668, 2019 Leg., 54th Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2019) (containing recently ratified 
New Mexico ethics reforms); Ark. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2018-135 (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www. 
arkansasag.gov/assets/opinions/2018-135.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS47-8RA7] (discussing fair 
redistricting state constitutional amendments pending in Arkansas); Letter from Donald J. 
McTigue, Att’y, Ohioans for Secure and Fair Elections, to Dave Yost, Ohio Att’y Gen. (Feb. 
10, 2020), https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/getattachment/c380e08c-ef3f-4408-bfb6-
ad4530339393/The-Secure-and-Fair-Elections-Amendment-(Resubmiss.aspx [https://perma 
.cc/5NFM-QVEW] (election access); S.D. Att’y Gen, Constitutional Amendment:  Attorney 
General’s Statement (June 19, 2017), https://sdsos.gov/elections-voting/assets/Ballot 
%20Question%20Documents/2018/2018_CA_AGStatement_V1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2APD 
-8DCC] (anti-corruption). 
 231. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450–51 (1939). 
 232. U.S. CONST. arts. V, VII. 
 233. See Merritt, supra note 29, at 50. 
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Enforcing the guarantee through a ratification condition is also consistent 
with the Necessary and Proper Clause, especially where a constitution (state 
or federal) is facilitating unrepublican practices.  Constitutions impose 
unrepublican government on the people when a court interprets a provision 
to create an unrepublican outcome or when a provision of a constitution 
comes to be recognized as unrepublican.  An example of the first scenario is 
the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford234 case, in which the Supreme Court 
interpreted the word “citizens” in the Constitution not to include Black 
Americans.235  An example of the second scenario is the Three-Fifths Clause, 
which granted slave states extra representation in Congress.  To restore 
republican government in either scenario, it is necessary to pass an 
amendment overturning a constitutional holding or superseding a 
constitutional provision.  Modern examples of this might include spurring an 
amendment to overturn the Supreme Court’s campaign finance holdings or 
to supersede the constitutional provisions establishing the Electoral College 
or equal state representation in the Senate. 
Not only are ratification conditions consistent with Articles I and V, but 
they closely mirror Congress’s well-settled authority under Article IV to 
condition the admission of new states into the Union on changes to the 
proposed state’s law.  Like the Guarantee Clause, the section empowering 
Congress to admit new states into the Union does not specify any procedures 
for, or limits on, executing this authority.236  Yet, Congress has consistently 
used this power to impose conditions on new states to ensure the state is a 
cohesive member of a republican federal system.237  Indeed, Congress has 
imposed conditions on nearly every state admitted to the Union post-1788, 
including conditions to alter a territory’s legal system and to guarantee 
certain civil liberties when Congress was suspicious of a new state’s 
commitment to democratic governance.238 
2.  Constitutional Incentives:  Financial Carrots and Seating Sticks 
Congress has two principal powers at its disposal for incentivizing states 
to enact republican reforms:  the spending power (a carrot) and the seating 
power (a stick).239  When acting pursuant to the Guarantee Clause, Congress 
may use these Article I powers to condition federal money and 
representatives’ seating in Congress on state legislatures approving new laws 
necessary to restore republican government. 
 
 234. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. 
 235. Id. at 404. 
 236. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 237. See Eric Biber, The Price of Admission:  Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions 
Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 120–21 (2004). 
 238. See id. at 139. 
 239. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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Use of the spending power to this end is clearly constitutional.240  As 
discussed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed Congress’s power to 
financially incentivize state action, so long as the financial inducement 
offered is not “so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into 
compulsion.’”241  In using its spending power to enforce its guarantee 
obligation, Congress may offer new funds in exchange for the adoption of 
new policies or offer to pay for the political reforms it seeks.  It may also 
threaten to withdraw funding from state agencies engaging in unrepublican 
practices or condition the continued receipt of a reasonable amount of 
existing funding on a state enacting desired reforms.242  The Supreme Court 
has already sanctioned Congress’s use of its spending power in this way at 
least once by upholding, as a condition of funding, a requirement that state 
agencies prohibit their employees from taking active part in political 
campaigns.243 
The seating power is a more limited, yet very powerful, stick available to 
Congress to incentivize state compliance with republican principles.  Article 
I permits each chamber of Congress to “be the Judge of the Elections, Returns 
and Qualifications of its own Members.”244  Under this provision, Congress 
is the ultimate authority on whether one of its members was duly elected and 
is duly qualified to serve.  Article I lists three qualifications for membership, 
in the form of age, residency, and citizenship requirements.245 
But it also implies a fourth, tacit requirement that members are elected in 
a republican manner and represent republican states.  The Constitution 
requires members of Congress to be elected by the people.246  These words 
carry the implicit requirement that members be chosen in a republican 
manner by citizens who enjoy complete equality in their shared right to 
popular representation.247  The Constitution’s vesting of the legislative 
 
 240. Even Professor Merritt agrees that “induc[ing] changes in state governmental 
structures” through the spending clause is a legitimate use of federal power that comports with 
federalism principles. Merritt, supra note 29, at 46–49. 
 241. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
 242. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578 (2012). 
 243. See Oklahoma v. U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1947). 
 244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 245. Id. § 3. 
 246. Id. § 2 (providing that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members 
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States,” who shall, “when elected, be 
an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen”); id. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the 
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, elected by the people thereof, 
for six years.”). 
 247. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8, 14 (1964).  In Wesberry, the Court held 
malapportionment in congressional districts unconstitutional, reasoning that, “construed in its 
historical context, the command of Art. I, § 2 that Representatives be chosen ‘by the People 
of the several States’ means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional 
election is to be worth as much as another’s.” Id. at 7–8 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2).  The 
Court continued: 
To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would not only run 
counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the 
principle of a House of Representatives elected “by the People” . . . . 
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power in a Congress similarly presumes this body to be exactly what that 
word implies—a republican deliberative body comprised of representatives 
from republican states.248  Reading an implied republican requirement into 
Article I’s qualifications for office does not run afoul of the separate 
requirements that each state have at least one representative and that no state 
be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate, because both those provisions 
assume that the representatives and states in question are true representatives 
and proper states in good constitutional standing under the Guarantee Clause.  
A tacit republican qualification is also consistent with the Constitution’s 
recognition that Congress has an independent institutional interest in the 
integrity of congressional elections.249  For this reason, Article I permits 
Congress to supersede the states’ authority to make the rules for federal 
elections.250  It also permits Congress to punish a member for bad behavior 
and to expel a member.251  In the same way, the seating power enables 
Congress to protect its institutional interests by refusing to admit a 
representative elected in an unrepublican manner. 
It is thus constitutionally appropriate for Congress to incentivize a state to 
pass republican reforms by refusing to seat that state’s representatives where 
the states’ unrepublican practices directly impacted the unrepublican 
character of its congressional delegation.  Use of the seating power in this 
particular way is not unduly coercive because it is fully within both 
Congress’s power and its duty to ensure its own compliance with Article I.252  
While Congress may remedy most problems related to the republican 
integrity of federal elections under the Elections Clause, the Guarantee 
Clause recognizes the interrelation between state and federal political 
systems and how state and local unrepublican practices can directly impinge 
the ability of citizens to participate fairly and equally in federal elections.  
Where a state has proven demonstrably recalcitrant to self-correcting those 
unrepublican practices affecting the integrity of its election systems, 
Congress may use the seating power to induce the state into enacting the 
necessary republican reforms. 
 
. . . . 
. . . The House of Representatives, the Convention agreed, was to represent the 
people as individuals, and on a basis of complete equality for each voter. 
Id. at 8, 14. 
 248. Cf. Christopher R. Green, Loyal Denominatorism and the Fourteenth Amendment:  
Normative Defense and Implications, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 174 (2017) 
(arguing that a tacit loyalty requirement should be read into Article V and indeed, into the 
grant of all federal political power). 
 249. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 250. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but 
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places 
of chusing Senators.”). 
 251. Id. § 5. 
 252. See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion:  A 
Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1347 (2013) (“[A] 
conditional proposal is coercive if it would be wrongful for the maker to do as it threatens.”). 
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Unlike the spending power, therefore, the seating power may only be used 
reactively to enforce the Guarantee Clause.  It would be undemocratic to 
refuse to seat a member in anticipation of, or speculation over, a state’s 
unrepublican character.  Similarly, where a state’s federal election system 
fully complies with the principles of popular sovereignty and equal 
citizenship, Congress may not use the seating power to induce entirely 
unrelated republican reforms.  Otherwise, Congress would be attempting to 
restore republicanism in a way that risks eviscerating it.  Refusing to seat a 
duly elected representative would itself violate the principle of popular 
sovereignty and discriminate among equal citizens of different states. 
Case law and historical practice support Congress’s use of the seating 
power to enforce the Guarantee Clause.  The Supreme Court grasped the link 
between Congress’s seating power and the Guarantee Clause from the outset, 
reasoning in its first exposition of the guarantee power that Congress’s 
admission of senators and representatives under Article I amounts to its 
recognition under Article IV that the states from which they are elected are 
republican in character.253  It was this analysis that later inspired the 
Reconstruction Republicans to use the seating power to enforce the guarantee 
of republican government in the ex-Confederate states.254  Having 
determined that the representatives these states sent to Congress in 1865 were 
not elected in a republican manner, they deemed them unqualified under 
Article I to serve in Congress.255 
Importantly, their conclusion was not based on the ex-Confederate states’ 
former support for slavery and secession.  Rather, it was based on their 
ongoing disenfranchisement of the freed slaves, their adoption of Black 
Codes to undo the recently ratified Thirteenth Amendment, and their refusal 
to ratify the then pending Fourteenth Amendment.256  These acts evinced an 
obstinate commitment to retaining a race-based aristocracy instead of 
embracing a new republican norm of race-blind citizenship.  By perpetuating 
a web of political, social, and economic discrimination, the entire political 
apparatus of the ex-Confederate states retained its unrepublican character, 
which impugned the republican qualification of its delegations to Congress.  
In response, Congress conditioned the readmission of representatives from 
these states on their establishing republican forms of government, 
specifically by adopting a requirement of race-blind suffrage in their state 
constitutions and ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires equal 
citizenship and the exclusion of disloyal citizens from the ranks of 
government.257 
In its most extreme iteration, therefore, the Guarantee Clause empowers 
Congress to use the seating power to induce a state into voting to ratify an 
amendment to the Constitution.  Bruce Ackerman has argued that such a 
 
 253. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). 
 254. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 370. 
 255. See id. at 368–69. 
 256. See id. at 368–69, 377–78. 
 257. See COLEMAN, supra note 80, at 4. 
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process, as was used during Reconstruction, is so irregular that it does not 
comport with Article V.258  Akhil Amar has countered that the ex-
Confederate members were properly excluded because they were elected 
under unrepublican conditions, and the ratification condition was necessary 
to restore republican government in those states.259  The disagreement has 
been framed in terms of constitutional theory.  But a more basic way to 
understand the divergence is that Ackerman finds such an incentive scheme 
unconstitutionally coercive, whereas Amar recognizes that withholding 
something one is not qualified to have in the first place cannot, by definition, 
be coercive.  Amar is right.  Such a scheme lacks duress or undue influence.  
First, the state remains free to restore republican government voluntarily by 
its own means, which would render the incentive scheme unjustified and thus 
inoperable.  Second, both the inducement (seating in Congress) and the 
condition (ratification) are legal, discretionary acts.  Congress has full 
authority to expel members from unrepublican states, and this slimmed-down 
Congress may propose amendments and attach ratification conditions to 
them consistent with Article V.  It is true that Article V authorizes “The 
Congress” to propose amendments for ratification, but it is also Congress 
who judges its own membership and therefore defines what body properly 
constitutes “The Congress” for purposes of Article V. 
In sum, incentivizing a state to approve new law—including a new 
constitutional amendment—under either the spending or the seating power 
is, in certain circumstances, a constitutional exercise of the guarantee power.  
Under the spending power, such an incentive scheme falls squarely within 
Congress’s Article I powers and is not inconsistent with Article V so long as 
it is not coercive.  Under the seating power, it is proper to demand new laws 
ensuring congressional representatives are elected in a republican manner 
when such a law or amendment is necessary to restore republican government 
in the states and in Congress. 
C.  Dissolving and Reconstructing State Government 
Finally, in cases of severe republican collapse, the Guarantee Clause 
empowers Congress to dissolve a state government and convene a state 
constitutional convention to replace it.260  This was the tactic successfully 
pursued during Reconstruction, but it is undertheorized whether, outside the 
context of secession and war, doing so is within Congress’s constitutional 
purview.  It is.  The Guarantee Clause permits this extreme remedy in 
response to a total breakdown in republican government, such as when a state 
operates under a political caste system—whether on the basis of race, gender, 
class, property, or any other intrinsic or constructed distinction—or when a 
state eviscerates popular sovereignty by cancelling, stealing, or corrupting its 
elections. 
 
 258. See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 65, at 22–119. 
 259. AMAR, supra note 55, at 364–80. 
 260. See supra Part I.B. 
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The clause guarantees every state a republican “form” of government.  At 
the time of the clause’s drafting, the “form” of a state government was 
predominately established by state constitution, not substantive law.261  
Textually, the clause thus empowers Congress to guarantee a republican 
constitution to each state.  Focusing on this connection between the guarantee 
and the law of state constitutions, early abolitionists read the clause as 
empowering Congress to “dictate the form of [a state’s] fundamental code or 
constitution, with a view of rendering it consistent with . . . [a republican] 
form of government.”262  Not long after, the Supreme Court recognized 
Congress’s authority under the clause to decide “what government is the 
established one in a State.”263  The power to recognize a state government 
includes the inverse power of nonrecognition—or rather, the power to 
recognize the currently constituted government as illegitimate.264 
The Reconstruction Congress interpreted its power under the Guarantee 
Clause in exactly this way.  The linchpin of its Reconstruction agenda was 
unrecognizing the ex-Confederate states, dissolving these states’ 
governments and their post-Confederate constitutions, and convening new 
state conventions for the adoption of new state constitutions that were subject 
to congressional approval.265 
This use of the Guarantee Clause was reaffirmed by both coordinate 
branches and the people of the United States, imprinting it with constitutional 
legitimacy.  The public twice lent its consent at the ballot box, reelecting the 
Republicans overwhelmingly in 1866, after Congress had excluded Southern 
delegates from its membership, and again in 1868, following the 
implementation of Reconstruction in all eleven ex-Confederate states.266  
Importantly, the 1868 election was held after the reformation and 
readmittance of seven Southern states under the terms of the First 
Reconstruction Act, with the participation of voters in those states.267 
Both President Johnson and the Supreme Court, while at furious odds with 
this scheme, nonetheless acquiesced to this use of the guarantee power.268  
Johnson’s military maintained martial law, registered the freed Blacks to 
vote, and convened the state constitutional conventions.269  The Supreme 
Court similarly acceded in a trio of cases.  In Mississippi v. Johnson,270 the 
Court refused to prevent the president’s implementation of the First 
Reconstruction Act, even as it described the Act as “annihilat[ing] the State 
and its government, by assuming for Congress the power to control, modify, 
 
 261. See Heller, supra note 29, at 1717, 1745–46. 
 262. 12 REG. DEB. 4269 (1836). 
 263. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). 
 264. Cf. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 30 (2015). 
 265. See Bonfield, supra note 14, at 540–41; supra Part I.B. 
 266. See ACKERMAN, supra note 65, at 19–21. 
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and even abolish its government.”271  Next, in Georgia v. Stanton,272 the 
Court declined again to intercede to protect the Southern states’ “rights of 
sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government, [and] of corporate 
existence as a state” from federal intervention.273  It deemed these rights 
judicially unenforceable, fully understanding that judicial abstention would 
permit Congress to 
annul, and totally abolish the existing State government of Georgia, and 
establish another and different one in its place; in other words, would 
overthrow and destroy the corporate existence of the State, by depriving it 
of all the means and instrumentalities whereby its existence might, and, 
otherwise would, be maintained.274 
Finally, in Texas v. White,275 unable to dispose of the question on 
jurisdictional grounds, the Court gave its constitutional imprimatur to 
Reconstruction.276  It held that the excluded states remained sovereign 
entities, inescapably implying that their status as wards of federal 
Reconstruction did not unconstitutionally violate their state sovereignty.277  
The Court further confirmed that the guarantee of a republican form of 
government is bestowed on the people of a state, not on the state government, 
holding in essence that destruction of a state government to provide a 
republican state to the people is within Congress’s authority under the 
Guarantee Clause.278 
As the Supreme Court ultimately conceded, enforcing the Guarantee 
Clause by dissolving a state government, nullifying its constitution, and 
erecting a new republican government in its place is fully consistent with 
republicanism itself.  Undeniably, the people of the states must be able to 
form their own state governments free of undue federal interference or 
compulsion, otherwise the resulting state would also violate popular 
sovereignty.279  But federal intervention does not necessarily destroy the 
republican relationship between the people and their elected representatives.  
In certain instances, intervention is necessary to uphold and protect that 
relationship.  For example, the mechanism of federal preclearance adopted 
 
 271. Id. at 476. 
 272. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868). 
 273. Id. at 77. 
 274. Id. at 76. 
 275. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869). 
 276. See id. at 727–29, 731. 
 277. See id. at 726–29. 
 278. See id. at 721.  The Court nonetheless insisted that it was not passing judgment on the 
constitutionality of the First Reconstruction Act. Id. at 731 (“Nothing in the case before us 
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it relates to military authority, or to the paramount authority of Congress.”). 
 279. See Merritt, supra note 29, at 25, 61; Andrew Johnson, Veto Message (Mar. 2, 1867), 
reprinted in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, 
at 498, 511 (James D. Richardson ed., Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Off. 1897) (vetoing 
the First Reconstruction Act). 
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in the Voting Rights Act of 1965280 constitutionally permits federal review 
of laws passed by a state legislature exercising popularly delegated 
authority.281  It does so not to depress popular control but to vindicate it—to 
ensure that state law does not ultimately hamper the people’s ability to 
exercise their popular sovereignty.  So too with a republican reconstruction 
of a state government.  In that case, Congress would be interfering to 
facilitate a process by which the people could more freely exercise their 
sovereignty in a new convention. 
Moreover, it is imperative to grasp that popular sovereignty does not end 
at the state border.  While federal intervention may be unrepublican at one 
level, it is also the manifestation of a national republican system operating to 
ensure compliance with a national republican Constitution.  The people of 
the United States are also a popularly sovereign body and their collective 
will, as represented through federal action, is deserving of recognition in a 
republican system.282 
Where a state is not simply engaging in unrepublican practices but has 
abandoned a republican form of government, it is no longer in a constitutional 
federalist relationship with the Union.  In this case, the unrepublican state is 
more akin to a territory seeking admission as a new state.  The process of 
admitting a new state generally begins with a congressional enabling act that 
establishes a process by which the territory will hold a state constitutional 
convention and elections for state officers and congressional representatives.  
The enabling act also includes conditions for admission to statehood, 
including conditions of specific constitutional provisions the state is required 
to incorporate into its state constitution.283 
The permissible use of this enforcement mechanism is extremely 
restricted.  Here, the Necessary and Proper Clause actually performs a critical 
limiting function.284  It is only necessary to dissolve a state government and 
reconstitute the state’s constitution when faced with a total breakdown in 
republican government and the state’s unwillingness or inability to 
implement voluntary or federally mandated reforms.  It is only proper to do 
so when the democratic relationship between the state and its people is 
broken, such as when the state’s franchise is not a republican representation 
 
 280. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and 
52 U.S.C.). 
 281. The Supreme Court did not hold that a federal preclearance scheme is unconstitutional 
in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).  Rather, it held that any such scheme must 
be justified by current conditions. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 553. 
 282. As Chief Justice John Marshall opined, “the government of the Union . . . is, 
emphatically, and truly, a government of the people.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 404–05 (1819).  This was a recurrent theme in his jurisprudence:  the federal 
government represents the people of the United States as national citizens, not as citizens of 
individual states. See id.; see also Amar, supra note 29, at 751. 
 283. Biber, supra note 237, at 128. 
 284. In the context of the Guarantee Clause, the necessary and proper analysis may take on 
a sort of proportionality analysis, as Ryan Williams’s work suggests. See Williams, supra note 
30, at 634.  If indeed the guarantee reads as an international treaty-type commitment, as he 
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rules of proportionality. See id. at 608–11. 
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of the democratic majority or its electoral system is completely corrupt.  In 
this case, making state officials responsive to the federal government, as 
opposed to their constituency, does not interfere with an otherwise existing 
republican relationship between the state and its people.  Put differently, 
where there is no state government “in constitutional relations with the 
Union, it [becomes] the duty of the United States to provide for the 
restoration of such a government.”285 
At the same time, neither violence nor secession is a necessary precursor 
to the constitutional use of this enforcement mechanism.  The clause 
guarantees a republican form of government to “every State in this Union,” 
meaning a state is subject to even the most extreme exercise of the guarantee 
power while it is still in the Union.  And while the guarantee would certainly 
operate to prevent unrepublican changes effectuated through state-sanctioned 
violence, such violence is not a necessary predicate to enforcing the 
guarantee through dissolution and reconstitution.  The cure for a breakdown 
in republicanism is, firstly, other democratic mechanisms of restoring 
republican rule, such as federal incentives or legislation.  But where the state 
government prevents a republican change in representation, even without 
resort to violence, then the government is no longer in the hands of the people 
and is subject to federal takeover.286 
Finally, though the clause permits dissolution of a state government and 
state constitution, it does not empower the federal government to eject a state 
from the Union.  Such power is not only outside the scope of the clear 
language, purpose, and history of the Guarantee Clause, it is at odds with the 
very structure of the Constitution, which, “in all its provisions, looks to an 
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”287  The people of a 
state remain entitled to all the protections and privileges statehood provides, 
including the federal guarantee of a republican form of government, which 
conditions some of the privileges of states on their fulfilling their own 
constitutional obligations.288 
What kind of situation would warrant this remedy today?  The prospect of 
civil war and secession is tragically not such a farcical fear in this time of 
extreme political polarization.  The idea of states adopting governments 
resembling the antebellum Southern slave aristocracies is, thankfully, more 
outlandish.  There are, however, other equally unrepublican, if not 
comparably savage, forms of government that realistically threaten to take 
hold.  Part II discussed the widespread unrepublican practices of partisan 
gerrymandering and criminal disenfranchisement.  Such practices should be 
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the object of federal action under the Guarantee Clause pursuant to 
Congress’s legislative, spending, and potentially, seating powers.  But only 
more total and intractable unrepublican schemes merit state reconstruction, 
such as the propagation of a political caste system or corrupt electoral 
democracy. 
The potential reemergence of such antirepublican schemes is unfortunately 
no longer unimaginable.  Some state officials in recent years have signaled 
the prospect of total republican breakdown in their states by threatening to 
cancel or disregard elections, refusing to comply with federal law, or 
disempowering a political party that has been duly elected.  No example of 
this disturbing trend is starker than the recent attempts by various state 
lawmakers to overturn the outcome of the 2020 presidential election in their 
states.289  These subversive maneuvers came on the heels of numerous 
attempts by states to throw out hundreds of thousands of legally cast ballots 
in an effort to alter the outcome of the 2020 election.290  After their candidate 
lost the presidency, hundreds of state lawmakers propagated the lie that the 
election was stolen.291  This lie sparked a deadly insurrectionist attack on the 
U.S. Capitol building while the vice president and Congress tallied the 
electoral votes.292 
Such antirepublican schemes have been building for years.  Last year, 
Wisconsin leaders forced citizens to brave death and disease from the 
COVID-19 virus to vote in a special election for a state supreme court 
vacancy in an effort to tip the odds of securing a conservative majority on 
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that court.293  In the aftermath of the 2018 and 2016 election cycles, at least 
four state legislatures controlled by one party attempted to disempower a duly 
elected governor of the opposing party by stripping the governor of executive 
powers and corrupting the redistricting process.294  In Kentucky’s last 
gubernatorial election, incumbent governor Matt Bevin threatened to not 
leave office upon very narrowly losing reelection.295  Two other recent 
elections raised the serious possibility of a state cancelling or stealing a 
statewide election when the controlling party confronted defeat at the polls:  
one, when Republicans advocated for cancelling the 2017 Alabama Senate 
race,296 and another, when Republicans considered overturning the results of 
the 2016 North Carolina governor’s race.297  At the same time, state officials 
are increasingly disregarding federal laws with which they disagree, such as 
when Supreme Court of Alabama Chief Judge Roy Moore refused to enforce 
the constitutional right to same-sex marriage.298 
These escalating antirepublican threats and machinations are dangerous 
and corrupting.  For now, they mostly remain the individual blusters of 
ideologues as opposed to the wholesale corruption of republican government 
in any one state.  But they portend looming republican crises, especially in 
battleground states, that may eventually warrant federal takeover and 
reconstruction. 
IV.  THE SEPARATION OF THE GUARANTEE POWER 
The Constitution vests the guarantee power in the United States, 
contemplating a role for each of the federal branches to guarantee a 
republican form of government to every state.299  It is the only time the 
Constitution gives the United States a constitutional command.  As the 
obligation rests on the three branches in their composite form, it is shared 
according to the basic tripartite division of federal power established in 
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Articles I, II, and III.  Congress has the dominant role in enforcing the 
guarantee pursuant to its primary responsibility for overseeing national 
policy and calibrating federal relations.300  The executive and judiciary are 
charged with implementing and administering Congress’s agenda.301 
This allotment of power under the Guarantee Clause is mandated by the 
explicit textual delegation to Congress of the power to make all laws for 
carrying into execution “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States.”302  It is also implied from the character of 
the powers assigned to the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, 
including the assignment of nearly all matters of policy, security, and 
interstate affairs to Congress in Articles I and IV.  Founding-era Supreme 
Court cases confirm Congress’s primary role in discharging the duties 
entrusted to the federal government.303  Thereafter, an unbroken line of cases 
and executive branch precedent specifically affirm Congress’s prerogative to 
enforce the Guarantee Clause.304  Finally, multiple generations of Americans 
have endorsed Congress’s role as the primary enforcer of structural political 
rights by ratifying constitutional amendments vesting Congress with the 
authority to enforce such rights.305 
As these amendments recognize, the assignment of power to Congress to 
effectuate political process rights comports with the Constitution’s separation 
of powers and is most compatible with the institutional competencies of the 
three branches.  Contrary to widespread scholarly opinion, the judiciary is 
quite ill equipped to review and to enforce the Guarantee Clause.  The very 
nature of the guarantee power, therefore, demands judicial restraint.  While 
courts have a proper checking role to play, as one part of the manifold checks 
and balances that interconnectedly constrain Congress’s discretion under the 
Guarantee Clause, it would be improper for the courts to take a heavy hand 
in reviewing or exercising the guarantee power.  Hard review threatens to 
dilute the clause out of existence, and enforcement of the guarantee from the 
bench, while permissible, risks poorly implemented, unaccountable, and 
politically disastrous reforms.306 
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A.  Congressional Predominance 
The assignment to Congress of principal authority to enforce the 
Guarantee Clause is a valuable allocation of constitutional power.  It 
leverages institutional competencies, democratic accountability, and 
competing institutional incentives to ensure the power is viable but not overly 
perilous.  Congress is best suited to determine whether a state is 
unrepublican, and how to reform it, because these are quintessential political 
questions that fall squarely within the legislative domain.307  They require 
political calculi and negotiation, as well as policy ingenuity and expertise. 
Congress’s legitimacy over these matters is furthered by the relative 
transparency and accountability of its operations.  Congressional action is 
generally open to public view and allows a prompt appeal to the people 
through a biennial election cycle.308  It is also the branch most responsive to 
mass movements and most partnered with civil society, which permits a 
larger share of popular influence over congressional lawmaking, from policy 
inception to post hoc review.  It is perhaps for these reasons that the dominant 
periods of constitutional transition in this country have stemmed from 
legislative action supported by a groundswell of popular support, including 
Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the civil rights era.  These transitions can 
claim a popular mandate that executive and judicially managed constitutional 
changes have never enjoyed.309  Popular reaffirmation boosts the legal 
legitimacy of a practice, which in turn pulls other governing institutions in 
line.  This process of snowballing legitimacy is how Congress has 
successfully revised constitutional norms through legislative feats.310 
What momentum Congress gains from its institutional competency and 
popular support, however, is usefully checked by its institutional 
 
Sen. Benjamin Wade).  The law passed in both chambers but was pocket vetoed by President 
Abraham Lincoln. See COLEMAN, supra note 80, at 2.  The executive branch itself came to the 
same conclusion in a memo prepared for President Franklin D. Roosevelt amidst a breakdown 
in republican government in Louisiana under Governor Huey Long. Memorandum from 
Alexander Holtzoff to the Att’y Gen. (Apr. 8, 1935).  Consistent with the tripartite division of 
power under the Guarantee Clause, it is for Congress to make the first move under the clause, 
at least where the target state remains in the Union and is not subject to invasion or insurrection 
(which is dealt with in separate constitutional provisions and which the president has delegated 
authority to address under the Militia Acts of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (May 2, 1792); ch. 33, 
1 Stat. 271 (May 8, 1792)). 
 307. See Alexander, supra note 29, at 768–69 (“Congress has both the expertise and 
experience to enforce the Guarantee Clause and to resolve the political matters it implicates.”). 
 308. While reelection is usually a poor correlate of public approval for any single 
government action, especially when elections are subverted through antidemocratic tactics like 
gerrymandering and vote denials, it is likely a decent indicator of public approval for 
reconstruction legislation.  Such legislation would be a banner policy initiative and therefore, 
a top voting issue.  It is also likely to make the next election cycle fairer and more 
representative and thus, more indicative of the people’s stance on Congress’s record. 
 309. For example, the women’s rights movement has enjoyed greater success in the areas 
of education and employment equality than it has in the area of reproductive justice.  The 
former was supported by popular appeal and congressional legislation; the latter has largely 
been advanced by courts and continues to be beset by backlash. 
 310. See ACKERMAN, supra note 65, at 17–25 (describing this process of constitutional 
transformation). 
2021] RECONSTRUCTING STATE REPUBLICS 2217 
inefficiency.  Congress is the least efficient branch, requiring majority 
consent for any legislative action, and the branch most responsive to the 
interests of the states.  Being comprised of members accountable to state 
constituencies, Congress has an institutional self-interest in exercising 
restraint in its meddling in state affairs—after all, a vote to target a state is a 
self-inflicted wound on a body comprised of state representatives.  There is, 
therefore, an internal détente, or mutually assured destruction, aspect to 
congressional exercise of the guarantee power that valuably ratchets down 
the political impetus to use it.  In this way, vesting the guarantee power in 
Congress is itself a built-in check on that power. 
Scholars have argued, however, that political process rights, and voting 
rights in particular, “cannot safely be left to our elected representatives, who 
have an obvious vested interest in the status quo.”311  The argument assumes 
that breakdowns in republican government are the type of political problem 
a representative political body is unlikely to address.312  A similar criticism 
worries that entrusting a political body with the power to alter the political 
process will lead to self-dealing and self-entrenchment.313  In essence, these 
objections assume that Congress is both least likely to enforce the guarantee 
and most likely to abuse the guarantee power because the power permits 
Congress to affect its own political prospects. 
But both history and political psychology cast doubt on these objections to 
granting Congress primary authority for ensuring republican government in 
the states.  As the Framers recognized, it is precisely because Congress has a 
political incentive to use the guarantee power to aggrandize its own influence 
that it should be vested there—with proper checks.314  In times of severe 
republican rot, the electorate becomes both more closely divided and more 
dramatically polarized.  This phenomenon inevitably incentivizes one of the 
major political parties—the one more reliant on broader popular support—to 
enact republican reforms so as to gain the upper edge in a closely divided 
electorate.  It further incentivizes targeting specific states with the worst 
republican track records because, in this environment, electoral shifts in just 
a few states are likely to make a decisive difference in the Electoral College 
and the composition of the Senate.  Republican reform is politically feasible, 
therefore, because it is political.315 
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While it is not certain that during every republican crisis the party that is 
politically positioned to desire republican reforms will come to power, the 
rapid oscillation of political power that attends these periods makes it likely 
that at some point during the crisis, that party will hold a majority.  These 
large swings are the result of that same political phenomenon of an electorate 
that is simultaneously closely divided and deeply polarized.  The confluence 
of these two traits in the electorate stimulates the renewed energy of base 
voters, heightens the political involvement of previously apolitical actors, 
and destabilizes the political allegiances of moderate voters as the parties 
move to the poles.  Such dramatic shifts in the electorate result in sudden and 
dramatic shifts in the political landscape. 
The American electorate has experienced these exact changes over the past 
three decades—becoming at once extremely polarized and exceptionally 
closely divided.316  This shift has, predictably, resulted in frequent swings in 
power.  Three times during this period, the political party with the incentive 
to enact republican reforms has had unified control of government—
including now during the 117th Congress.  That party is the Democratic Party 
in this moment, just as it was the Republican Party in 1865.  Certainly, 
winning united control of the federal government requires the Democrats to 
overcome the unrepublican obstacles discussed throughout this Article, 
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including partisan gerrymandering, disenfranchisement, and the 
malapportionment of the Senate and Electoral College.  They are boosted, 
however, by the cycles of political oscillation that characterize a deeply 
polarized and closely divided electorate.  The base of the party is energized 
and prodemocracy reformers are well organized and well funded.  In states 
across the country, election reformers are beating the odds to create 
independent redistricting commissions and put ethics, campaign finance, and 
election access initiatives on the ballot.317  Democrats are also younger, more 
diverse in an increasingly diverse country, and more closely aligned with a 
majority of independent voters.318 
It is inaccurate, therefore, to assume that those in power have no incentive 
to reform the processes that put them in power.  To the contrary, it is precisely 
periods of republican crisis that create the incentives to enact republican 
reforms and create a higher likelihood of political actors doing so.  History 
bears this out.  Congress has not indefinitely resisted changes to the status 
quo.  Rather, it has quite consistently acted to expand and defend the 
franchise precisely in moments where the political process is suffering 
extreme distress.  For example, it is clear that the Reconstruction Republicans 
used the Guarantee Clause to usher in radical political reforms in the South 
in an intertwined effort to effect social change and to expand their reach as a 
national party.319  They understood the political reality that permitting Black 
Americans to vote in the South would keep Confederate elites from being 
elected and undoing the work of Reconstruction.320  The republican crisis 
that caused deep political division thus worked to incentivize pro-republican 
reform. 
The same story repeated itself in the early part of the twentieth century.  
Republican rot stemming from massive disenfranchisement and political 
corruption, along with extreme partisan polarization, spurred Progressive-era 
Republicans to secure the direct election of senators,321 the initiative and 
referendum, and the enfranchisement of women.  It was a new Republican 
majority elected to both the House and Senate in 1919 that immediately set 
about ratifying the Nineteenth Amendment to shore up the party’s political 
support in the upcoming 1920 presidential election.322  In the civil rights era, 
a Democratic Congress and president acted to address the dramatically 
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unrepublican disenfranchisement of Black Americans by passing sweeping 
voting rights reforms that upended established federalist relations.323  Their 
reforms had the quite intentional consequence of also expanding Democratic 
power in the South.324  Again, during the Vietnam War, a time of intense 
political strife and republican infirmity, as young citizens dying for their 
country abroad were denied the right to help shape it at home, a Democratic 
Congress lowered the voting age to eighteen in all state and local elections 
ahead of the hotly contested 1972 election cycle.325  The Supreme Court 
struck down this law and was promptly overruled by legislative and popular 
command with the ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.326 
This same confluence of party interest and republican distress has also 
driven Congress to usher in critical periods of broader constitutional reform.  
The founding, Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the civil rights era were all 
the culminations of periods “of political agitation that prepared the way for a 
decade of decisive change” led by Congress.327  These transformations 
progressively shifted the United States away from “a decentralized federal 
system enabling white men to pursue their self-interest within a market 
economy,”328 toward a strong national government with the power to ensure 
equality and economic welfare—but that remains captured by oligarchical 
interests and aristocratic political processes.  Congress (or a legislative body 
like the Constitutional Convention) was a necessary engine of these badly 
needed transformations in the past precisely because such transformations 
were political, and politically advantageous, in nature.329 
That there is a political valence to republican reform, or constitutional 
reform more broadly, should not be off-putting.  Most republican reforms are 
wolves dressed in wolves’ clothing.  Reconstruction that affords a political 
advantage should not be immediately dismissed as devolution into an 
autocratic power grab.  The Reconstructionists were not autocrats, even as 
they cemented their power through republican reforms because, like the New 
Deal Democrats and civil rights leaders after them, they did not perpetuate 
their political power by delegitimizing democracy, stifling majority rule, or 
suppressing government transparency and accountability.  To the contrary, 
they pursued political approval the quintessentially democratic way:  by 
enacting popular reforms that expanded the democratic legitimacy of 
government.330 
At the same time, the potential for abuse of the guarantee power is checked 
by various restraints.  Besides the built-in inertia to use the guarantee power 
sparingly, congressional action must overcome various internal dissent 
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mechanisms, including constitutional requirements like majority rule and 
parliamentary hurdles innate to the committee system and to the debate and 
amendment processes.  There are also prolific external checks on Congress’s 
guarantee power:  the presidential veto, executive nonenforcement, judicial 
review, public opinion, and mass mobilization, to name a few.  The 
separation of parties, just as much as the separation of powers, also serves as 
a crucial check on a power that requires immense political capital and 
strategic planning.  Each of these checks has proven especially potent in 
times of divided government and political polarization.  These checks ensure 
that Congress’s use of the Guarantee Clause, like its use of its Article I 
powers, comports with popular demand and constitutional limitations. 
B.  Judicial Restraint 
The textual delegation of the guarantee power to Congress, coupled with 
Congress’s unique institutional capacity to exercise this power, supports a 
limited role for the courts in both reviewing congressional action under the 
clause and in exercising the guarantee power from the bench.  The Supreme 
Court is fairly ill suited to the tasks of reviewing and enforcing a power to 
develop political process rights.  On the reviewing side, the Court is 
accustomed to constraining congressional action to conform with 
conventional constitutional boundaries.  But this is particularly inappropriate 
when reviewing a power that permits improvements to our constitutional 
scheme.  On the enforcement side, the Court has proven itself doctrinally and 
institutionally ill equipped to protect political process rights in times of 
republican crisis.  The Court is not prohibited by the Constitution to reverse 
course and develop the doctrinal framework for fulfilling the federal 
government’s guarantee obligation.  But its track record illustrates the folly 
in expecting, or even desiring, the Court to get into the business of enforcing 
the Guarantee Clause. 
1.  Modest Review 
A circumscribed review process is vital for reviewing a power whose very 
purpose is to usher in major changes to state governments.  Such reforms are 
likely to be novel and to upend constitutional norms.  They will inevitably 
have some effect on both individual and structural constitutional rights.  This 
is permissible under the Guarantee Clause in pursuit of safeguarding 
republican government in the states.  Holding Congress to current 
understandings of rights and limits, therefore, would essentially amputate the 
Guarantee Clause from the Constitution.  If the Court does not give sufficient 
discretion to Congress to alter constitutional norms pursuant to the Guarantee 
Clause, it will rewrite that power in the guise of reviewing it. 
The Court’s proper role in reviewing Guarantee Clause legislation, 
therefore, is not to ensure Congress comports precisely with the 
constitutional status quo but to ensure it is not abusing its power in pursuit of 
republican reform.  There is no room between these limits for most exercises 
of congressional authority:  if Congress oversteps its bounds, it has abused 
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its power.  The Guarantee Clause is slightly different, however.  Because it 
permits Congress to define the meaning of republican government, it 
inherently empowers Congress to reevaluate constitutional norms to bring 
the states into alignment with republican principles.  What the clause does 
not permit is for Congress to use this power pretextually for the purpose of 
self-entrenchment or self-aggrandizement.  The Court, therefore, must serve 
as a classic check on congressional power—meaning as a guardian against 
abuse of that power—without serving in its typical role as a steward of 
conventional constitutional boundaries. 
There are three inflection points in the use of the guarantee power and thus, 
three places for possible abuse.  The first is to determine what republican 
government requires, the second is to establish whether a state is in violation 
of this requirement, and the third is to select the means by which to correct 
the violation.  The first and third determinations are quintessential political 
questions about which the Court should defer to Congress.  These are 
questions of evolving norms and values, of policy and of politics.  They fall 
squarely within Congress’s constitutional bailiwick and should be subject to 
nothing more than rational basis review.  The question here is solely whether 
Congress’s criteria for republican government is rationally related to 
enhancing the principles of popular sovereignty and equal citizenship and 
whether the means selected is rationally related to enforcing that criteria.331 
The second point of analysis—whether a state has violated the new 
republican norm—is a question of fact and highly susceptible to pretextual 
determinations.  Evaluating this type of legislative finding is within the 
judiciary’s core competence.  Though the Court should view congressional 
findings with deference, as it does when evaluating other legislative 
enactments, it should examine the adequacy of these findings and, most 
importantly, peek behind the legislative record to interrogate whether the 
determination that a state’s republican form has devolved is a pretext for self-
dealing or self-entrenchment.  Courts regularly examine government motives 
when reviewing whether a government action violates the Equal Protection 
Clause or the First Amendment precisely because these rights protect against 
the abuse of government discrimination.332  So too with political reform 
pursuant to the Guarantee Clause.  The abuse to be checked is the 
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government’s use of this power to treat certain citizens’ political rights more 
favorably than others’.333 
Two examples illustrate the proper analysis.  Suppose Congress 
determines that partisan gerrymandering is unrepublican and passes a law 
banning its use in drawing state voting districts.  The Court should review 
the rationality of the determination that political gerrymandering violates the 
principles of popular sovereignty and equal justice and that the means 
selected for eliminating this practice are rationally related to accomplishing 
that end.  It must then take a closer look at whether partisan gerrymandering 
is actually occurring in the states.  If Congress can amass a record that it is 
occuring, the Court should uphold the law.  Conversely, imagine Congress 
determines that overvoting is contrary to republican government and passes 
a law requiring voters to present government-issued identification to vote.  
The Court’s review of whether overvoting is unrepublican and whether the 
hypothetical voter identification law is a proper means of correcting this 
problem is limited to rational basis review.  It must then take a closer look at 
whether overvoting is actually occurring in the states.  If the problem is a 
pretextual excuse for imposing a politically convenient law, the Court must 
exercise its constitutional checking function and strike down the law as an 
abuse of the guarantee power. 
These examples also illustrate, by way of juxtaposition, how the Supreme 
Court has recently fundamentally erred in reviewing similar legislation.  In 
Crawford v. Marian County Election Board,334 the Court upheld Indiana’s 
stringent voter photo identification law without requiring Indiana to present 
any real evidence that voter impersonation fraud was occurring in the 
state.335  The Court rightly accepted the state’s determination that voter fraud 
is a legitimate problem states may address and that an identification law may 
help address the problem, but it refused to peek behind the curtain to see if 
the problem existed in the state at all.336  The Court also reasoned that the 
partisan nature of the law is of no avail so long as a valid, nonpartisan 
rationale is offered.337  Certainly, the partisan valence of a law is not a reason 
in itself to strike it down.  But by focusing solely on the legal justification 
for the law, as opposed to its factual justification, the Court failed to 
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distinguish partisan abuse from political reform.  The Court made the same 
analytical error in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute,338 in upholding an 
Ohio law that removed voters from the state’s voter rolls if they had not voted 
in the last two elections and failed to return a postcard.339  Again, the Court 
rightly deferred to Ohio on whether voter roll accuracy is a legitimate 
concern, but it shirked its checking responsibility by disregarding entirely the 
fact that voter roll inaccuracy is not a problem in Ohio and that the state’s 
solution to this fictitious problem was not rationally related to solving it.340  
In reality, the postcard system produced massive and racially biased 
inaccuracies in the rolls.341 
Judicial modesty in this area is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
understanding of the limits of its jurisdictional competence to address 
questions of a fundamentally political nature.  As seminally articulated in 
Baker v. Carr,342 the political question doctrine holds that claims that require 
the Court to make decisions the Constitution assigns to the political branches 
fall outside the Court’s Article III jurisdiction.343  An act of Congress under 
the Guarantee Clause is not immunized from review by the political question 
doctrine; actions taken by the political branches that have a substantial effect 
on states or individuals rarely should be.  But the same underlying policy 
considerations for political question abstention are present when the Court 
reviews an act pursuant to the guarantee power.344  In particular, a more 
robust review of Guarantee Clause legislation will require the courts to make 
judgments about the republican health of states.  There are likely few 
judicially manageable standards for this, which risks drawing the Court into 
the thorniest of political thickets and sparking a catastrophic loss of trust and 
institutional integrity.345  The political question doctrine is therefore 
instructive for why courts should demonstrate heightened judicial humility 
when reviewing Congress’s exercise of the guarantee power. 
This was undoubtedly the Supreme Court’s calculus during 
Reconstruction when it sidestepped reviewing Congress’s use of the 
guarantee power to dismantle and reconfigure the ex-Confederate states.  The 
Reconstruction Court’s refusal to review Congress’s ratification scheme for 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments was particularly proper.  Perhaps 
counterintuitively, judicial restraint is especially warranted where Congress 
acts to enforce the guarantee by inducing states to pass a constitutional 
amendment.  The amendment process is the only tool available to the political 
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branches to check the Supreme Court’s authority to say what the Constitution 
means.  It is for this reason that the Court refrains from reviewing the Article 
V amendment process.  Where Congress effectuates an amendment under 
Article V via the guarantee power, therefore, it is vital to the system of checks 
and balances that the Court abstain from reviewing that use of the guarantee 
power.346  In this one context, Congress’s actions cross the line from meriting 
deferential treatment to being unreviewable. 
Though giving Congress wide discretion to make structural political 
changes in the states would recalibrate current separation of powers doctrine, 
there is less cause for concern than might immediately appear.347  The 
Supreme Court has far more often struck down or whittled away necessary 
reforms than been a guardian of republican rights against congressional 
overreach.348  Time and again, it has truncated the scope of constitutional 
rights and refused to interpret capacious rights language in the Constitution, 
well, capaciously.  It has written out of the Constitution fundamental rights, 
including those protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and it has significantly diminished Congress’s 
rights-enforcement authority.349  Where it has struck down congressional 
overreach, it has mostly done so to vindicate economic liberty as opposed to 
political equality.  Altering the balance of power between the judiciary and 
Congress under the Guarantee Clause, therefore, is more likely to enhance, 
rather than diminish, the advancement of political process rights. 
2.  The Empty Promise of Judicial Enforcement 
Whether federal courts should be involved in enforcing the guarantee 
power in the first instance is a different question, but it is one that raises many 
of the same issues of judicial competence.  The Supreme Court has a long 
and nearly unbroken line of precedent declaring the Guarantee Clause 
nonjusticiable.350  The reasoning underlying these decisions has been the 
subject of nearly universal criticism by scholars for the past half century.351  
Yet, as these scholars have argued for the clause’s justiciability, eagerness 
for a judicial solution to antirepublican transgressions by states has crowded 
out any serious reflection on whether the Court is a desirable or effective 
vehicle for republican reform. 
A holistic and candid assessment of the Court’s record in defending and 
expanding political equality reveals a sorry tradition of preventing, 
curtailing, or ignoring deeply needed political reforms.  In case after case, the 
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Court proves itself at best a mediocre champion of political rights and at 
worst, a complicit, if not active, perpetrator of political oppression.  To wit, 
one of the only times the Court reviewed a Guarantee Clause claim, it held 
that denying women the right to vote did not render a state government 
unrepublican.352  At the same time, at the height of the Jim Crow era, the 
Court neutered the Privileges or Immunities Clause, cabined the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s reach to affirmative state action, and sanctioned extreme racial 
inequality and segregation.353  Thereafter, the Court endorsed literacy tests 
and poll taxes as prerequisites for voting.354  It continued to tolerate political 
subjugation and violence well into the twentieth century, including by 
acquiescing to the forceable denial of political and civil rights, upholding 
white primaries, and suppressing free speech and assembly.355  The trajectory 
of the Court’s track record has never really improved.  Over the past fifty 
years, it has not only permitted but actively exacerbated disenfranchisement 
and political inequality, while undercutting Congress’s ability to enact civil 
rights reforms.356  The explanations for this miserable record are many and 
sometimes idiosyncratic, attributable perhaps to an unlucky confluence of 
timing, personalities, and political reality.  But the principle causes of the 
Court’s failures in this area are institutional—they are the direct result of 
structural disadvantages and doctrinal flaws. 
First, as scholars of political entrenchment have increasingly brought to 
light, the Court has developed few analytical tools for resolving structural 
political problems by having committed itself to a doctrine that myopically 
reviews such questions solely through an individual rights framework.357  
This self-inflicted wound on the Court’s competence has led to an amassing 
of jurisdictional safety valves, including the political question doctrine and 
the generalized grievance doctrine of standing, that remove the Court entirely 
from safeguarding the health of the democratic process.  Indeed, the few 
times the Court has vindicated political process rights, it only accomplished 
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this result because the political harm at issue was amenable to correction 
through an individual rights analysis under the Equal Protection Clause or 
the Fifteenth Amendment.358 
Even if the Supreme Court were to develop the appropriate doctrinal 
standards for enforcing the Guarantee Clause, however, it would find it 
difficult to apply such standards in a manageable and evenhanded fashion.359  
This is true as a matter of legal doctrine and institutional structure.  First, as 
a matter of doctrine, there is no principled interpretive methodology for 
determining the contemporary meaning and requirements of republican 
government that is divorced from baseline political assumptions.  For 
example, there is no legal formula for why partisan gerrymandering violates 
republicanism while majority-minority districts or term limits do not.  All 
three work extraconstitutional, state-imposed limitations on the people’s 
choice of representatives.  The answer lies in policy determinations about 
what best serves political equality. 
The Guarantee Clause is thus ill suited for judicial enforcement because 
its standards rely on political assessments.  The power is bounded by nothing 
more than the meaning of republican government, which is an indefinite and 
evolving political concept.  Its indefiniteness alone is not judicially 
unmanageable; the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses are equally 
indeterminate.  But unlike those clauses that relate to common-law rights, the 
guarantee of republican government refers to a contemporary set of 
politically constructed rights. 
The guarantee power, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, was designed to 
keep states within the specturm of contemporary republican norms—and 
there is no apolitical formula for defining that specturm.  It is the 
contemporary political norms, not legal standards, that explain how slavery 
was apparently consistent with republicanism—until it was not—and why, 
when it no longer was, women’s disenfranchisement was still unproblematic, 
until that too fell out of republican repute, even as young adults continued to 
be denied the vote.  All of these practices violated popular sovereignty and 
equal citizenship, but those are political, not legal, principles.  And while 
drawing these kinds of socially constructed lines is not a problem for 
Congress as a policymaking representative body, it is more difficult and 
problematic for courts to do so. 
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Second, beyond the doctrinal difficulties in enforcing the Guarantee 
Clause, the Supreme Court is also institutionally ill suited to the task.  The 
Court is an unrepresentative, unelected political body cloaked in the garb of 
a neutral arbiter.  The Constitution designed it as such.  It is part of an 
independent branch whose composition, jurisdiction, and regulations are 
controlled almost entirely by political processes.  It does not operate 
impartially so much as autonomously, according to political ambitions and 
agendas.  This design renders the Court neither legitimately political nor truly 
apolitical, putting it at an awkward disadvantage when it comes to the task of 
defining contemporary political norms. 
The first hurdle this design presents is that it ensures the Court will 
exercise the guarantee power through the lens of the Justices’ political priors 
but provides them with no political accountability mechanisms that would 
benefit their analyses.  Lacking meaningful transparency, accountability, and 
representativeness, the Court is more likely to err in its political calculus 
about when and how to fulfill the guarantee.  Worse still, any such attempts 
risk catastrophic institutional damage.  The Court’s power depends on public 
acceptance of its legitimacy, which itself depends on the Court maintaining 
a mirage of impartiality.  Where the Court appears overtly political, it 
weakens public confidence and with it, its own authority.  The Court appears 
to have understood this predicament recently when declining to intervene in 
the practice of partisan gerrymandering so as to avoid political 
pronouncements that risked undermining the public perception of judicial 
neutrality.360 
The Court’s lawmaking authority is also less suited to devising republican 
reforms.  Its ability to pronounce legal reforms is highly constrained by the 
procedural posture and issues presented in the cases before it.  Case-by-case 
review cabins courts’ remedial discretion to mostly two options:  upholding 
or invalidating the specific practice before them.  It rarely permits the sort of 
fine-tuned and imaginative solutions required to remediate republican rot.  A 
legislative body, conversely, has the authority to investigate political 
problems holistically, in their varying origins and iterations, and to craft 
nuanced and comprehensive reform programs that need not have a tight fit 
with remedying one specific political injury. 
Indeed, it was not any of the Court’s holdings expanding political process 
rights in the civil rights era—including its invalidation of malapportionment, 
racial disenfranchisement measures, and barriers to ballot access—that had 
anywhere near the democratizing impact of the suite of civil rights legislation 
Congress enacted.  The crown jewel of Congress’s legislative assault on the 
racist republican rot infecting the states at that time was the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965.  That Act alone outlawed literacy and moral character tests, 
penalized public and private vote suppression tactics, and set up a system of 
federal preclearance, observation, and voter registration in problematic 
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districts.361  As a result of the Act, a quarter million Black Americans 
registered to vote the same year the law passed; within three years, the 
number of registered Black Americans doubled in the South; within twenty 
years, the number of Black Americans elected to the South’s state legislatures 
grew from three to 176.362  By abandoning a case-by-case approach for 
sweeping, federalized reform, Congress did what the Court had not for over 
one hundred years. 
Finally, the Court is not well positioned to respond to political crises, and 
the guarantee power is essentially a republican emergency response power.  
This is true for many of the reasons just articulated:  the Court is least able to 
negotiate political solutions or to act in an overtly political manner.  It is also 
true because the Court requires far more time than the political branches to 
review and respond to an emergency.  It is possible to circumvent the lengthy 
timeline of litigation through emergency petitions, but doing so would do 
nothing to address why the Court requires time in the first instance.  It is 
underresourced and inexperienced at resolving issues without the benefit of 
the record that litigation produces.  It is no wonder, therefore, that again and 
again, the Court proves incapable of or unwilling to resolve national or 
immediate political crises. 
All these observations are not necessarily meant to identify undesirable 
traits in how the Court operates or to provide an especially negative 
assessment of the Court’s role.  They are rather meant to point out that the 
Court is fairly ill suited to address the republican rot in America today.  Its 
limited doctrinal framework and weak historical record show it is a poor 
overseer of political process rights.  This conclusion is also not meant to 
suggest that there is no role for the Court to play in enforcing the Guarantee 
Clause.  Litigants should continue to press the Court to develop new doctrine 
to protect political process rights on a parallel track with the political 
branches and the states.  What this analysis does argue is that placing all our 
eggs in the basket of judicial activism is highly improvident—it is a strategy 
with little chance of success that could only ever deliver incremental reform, 
while diverting our best legal and political resources away from the more 
viable avenue for accomplishing seismic, systemic reforms.  Legislative 
intervention is a far more potent tool for resetting democracy than judicial 
tinkering.  When republican reforms are within the majority party’s political 
interest, there is no more powerful lever for breaking a cycle of tit-for-tat 
political devolution and engaging in a full reset of constitutional 
republicanism. 
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The Guarantee Clause, then, is not so much an “empty vessel” absent 
judicial enforcement, as it has so often been described; it is instead a 
legislative vessel in which to pour our modern notions of popular sovereignty 
and equal citizenship.  This was always the intended function of the clause.  
Writing in 1807, John Adams affirmed that the word republican “is so loose 
and indefinite that successive predominant factions will put glosses and 
constructions upon it as different as light and darkness.”363  The power to 
gloss the Constitution resides in the people; and the power to test new 
constructions of the clause properly belongs in Congress. 
CONCLUSION 
From the founders to the Reconstructionists, progressive era reformers, 
New Deal Democrats, and civil rights champions, multiple generations of 
Americans have periodically asserted the right to redefine the rules of the 
Republic.  Their mission has been symbiotically destructive and restorative, 
centered on recalibrating state authority and expanding equal sovereignty.  
Through this work, our systems of government have endured grave episodes 
of republican rot.  They have endured because they have adapted.  As 
Giuseppe di Lampedusa’s The Leopard explains:  for things to remain the 
same, everything must change.364  And everything can change quite rapidly 
when conditions are right—as they are right now. 
Indeed, the conditions are not only ripe, they are fleeting.   For republican 
government to survive, its modern failures must be addressed without delay.  
The place to start is a large-scale reconstruction of our political economy at 
the state level under the Guarantee Clause, which will have the effect of 
making the federal government less polarized and dysfunctional.  To this end, 
the new Democratic Congress should pass laws under the Guarantee Clause 
reforming districting and protecting access to the ballot.  It should further 
incentivize states to enfranchise all their adult citizens, limit political 
entrenchment and the anticompetitive lockup of democratic markets, and 
reduce the influence of money on governance.  Congress should also send 
constitutional amendments to the states, along with incentives to ratify those 
amendments, addressing outmoded provisions that increasingly work 
unrepublican harm to the nation, including abolishing the Electoral College, 
reconfiguring the Senate, and adding explicit protections for political process 
rights. 
Congress, not the judiciary, is the right institution to lead this work.  
Scholars, policymakers, and activists ought, therefore, to focus less on 
litigation strategies for protecting our elections and more on developing the 
details of systemic political process reforms.  In the guide of Reconstruction, 
part of this work must include critically rethinking the structural relationships 
between the federal branches, the federal and state governments, and the 
 
 363. Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (July 20, 1807), in 4 COLLECTIONS OF THE 
MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 332, 353 (Boston, Mass. Hist. Soc’y ser. 5 1878). 
 364. See GIUSEPPE DI LAMPEDUSA, THE LEOPARD 40 (Archibald Colquhoun trans., William 
Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 1960) (1958). 
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people and their governments to more robustly safeguard popular 
sovereignty and equal citizenship.  The Guarantee Clause offers the most 
direct and viable path forward for implementing such reforms. 
 
